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Participation in 
Electoral Politics 
Byron D'Andra Orey and Reginald Vance 
ne of the axioms of empirical political science is that elec- 
toral participation is more prevalent among those who are 
better off and more educated. Consequent to this axiom is 
the belief that those who participate more also gain more benefits 
from the system. Hence it is hardly a surprise when Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993, 10) argue that people participate in politics when the 
benefits of participating outweigh the costs. Under this assumption, 
we would expect that the overrepresentation of African Americans in 
the lower socioeconomic stratum would be accompanied by low lev- 
els of political participation. The literature on electoral behavior, 
however, has revealed that when socioeconomic factors and group 
consciousness are controlled for, poor African Americans tend to par- 
ticipate in politics at levels higher than those of their white counter- 
parts (Shingles 1981; Verba and Nie 1972). 
A second factor that helps us to determine what participation 
means is public opinion data-that is, aggregate information that cit- 
izens provide about their reasons for voting for or supporting politi- 
cal candidates. In democratic society there is little else as important 
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as expressions about citizen preferences. A number of important as- 
sumptions inspire our confidence in the importance of public opin- 
ion data for clarifying participation. Among these are that informa- 
tion is important to good citizenship; amid other entities, organized 
political groups and leaders provide much of that information; and 
active citizens consume available information and use it to make ra- 
tional decisions about their political preferences. Since in U.S. racial- 
ized history African Americans have been indelibly marked and have 
variously experienced widespread exclusion or status ambivalence, 
the group has consistently striven to alter those conditions. In the 
singularity of the group's political interest in securing universal in- 
clusion, African American political opinion and consequent political 
preferences have been easy to characterize. The group's political 
opinion is by and large liberal and social-change oriented-express- 
ing a preference for political leaders who promise to work toward al- 
tering conditions of racial exclusion and its concomitant barriers to 
socioeconomic advancement. 
This chapter traces the evolution of African American electoral par- 
ticipation and characterizes the political behavior that it has generated 
for this racialized community. First, the chapter examines this com- 
munity's behavior relative to the various political parties, the standard 
vehicles through which electoral participation is executed. It then ex- 
amines the voting behavior of African Americans. This is followed by 
case studies examining Black third-party efforts, political behavior dur- 
ing Reconstruction, and Jesse Jackson's bid for the presidency. 
Some Determinants of Political Behavior 
Political Socialization 
People develop opinions about political issues through a process 
called political socialization. Sources of such information include the 
church, family, school, peer groups, and protest demonstrations 
(Walton, Jones, and Ford 1997). These sources are referred to as 
agents of political socialization. Among African Americans, the 
church has been one of the most important such agents. Cone argues 
that the "black church was born in protest" (Cone 1997, 94). Even 
during the pre-Civil War period, churches encouraged liberation 
(Childs 1980). Katherine Tate (1991), in a study of Black participation 
in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections, finds that African Amer- 
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icans who belonged to political churches were more likely to partici- 
pate in politics. Aldon Morris reports that mass church involvement 
in the civil rights movement was inevitable, because the ministers of 
the movement were trained by those who "stressed human dignity" 
(Morris 1984, 8). Additionally, he and his colleagues note that "the 
movement itself was a tool of political socialization." 
Walton and Smith describe nontraditional agents of political so- 
cialization, such as "cultural events and projects." The authors refer 
to a content analysis of African American popular music conducted 
by Robert Walker (1976)) who found that there was an increase in 
"message songs" starting in the late 1950s. Walker also found that 
the apex of such "message music" occurred at the same time that the 
civil rights movement reached its peak, between 1966 and 1969 (Wal- 
ton and Smith 2000, 54). 
Similarly Walton and Smith (2000) argue that a significant amount 
of socialization has occurred through the presence of African Ameri- 
can candidates standing for electoral office since 1960. A particularly 
important socializing effect has occurred when Blacks have sought 
the seemingly improbable prize of the American presidency. They 
then discuss how Representative Shirley Chisholm set this tone when 
she became the first African American within the two-party structure 
to pursue the presidency in 1972. The most successful socializing ef- 
fect generated by a candidate occurred with Jesse Jackson's bid for the 
presidency in 1984 and 1988. Also notable is Alan Keyes's 1996 run 
as the first African American in the Republican Party presidential pri- 
mary, although he reached fewer African Americans voters than Jack- 
son had. 
Socioeconomic Factors and Participation 
In addition to the socialization process, socioeconomic factors play a 
major role in political participation among African Americans. Edu- 
cation is a major contributing variable, for example. Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone (1980, 18) note that because "schooling increases one's 
capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and 
intangible subjects, that is, subjects like politics," education increases 
the likelihood that one will vote. Similarly, income has been found to 
have an impact on participation. Tate (1993) notes that poor people 
probably have less time and energy for the "nonessentials" in life, in- 
cluding political participation. Despite this, the data indicate that 
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poor Blacks who are conscious of their economic subjugation are 
more likely to participate in politics, compared with whites. 
Political Participation and Croup Consciousness 
Because African Americans have most often been treated as a racial- 
ized group in the society, some political scientists have reasoned that 
such a group distinction might also affect political participation. 
Verba and Nie (1972) were among the first to analyze political partic- 
ipation as it relates to group consciousness. In their explanation of 
African Americans, the authors find that those who are conscious of 
being members of an oppressed group are most likely to participate 
in campaigns and cooperative activities. Shingles (1981) confirmed 
this correlation and also found that when socioeconomic variables 
are controlled for, African Americans participate at higher levels than 
members of other groups. This finding led him to extend the group 
consciousness thesis by including an analysis of the African Ameri- 
can poor. He found "black consciousness" to be a powerful explana- 
tory tool for the participation of the African American poor. For Shin- 
gles, poor African Americans who are conscious of group oppression 
are more inclined to have a cynical perception of government. That 
cynicism, however, is converted into various types of political effi- 
cacy, or empowerment. This "counter" empowerment in turn in- 
duces greater political participation. 
The findings of Shingles and others are inconsistent with the con- 
ventional wisdom about general determinants of political participa- 
tion. However, the data are persuasive and suggest that there is some- 
thing unique about political participation among Blacks as compared 
with other racial groups. Michael Dawson offers a solution to this co- 
nundrum. He argues that African Americans believe they have a 
"linked fate." That is, "a significant number of African Americans be- 
lieve that what happens to the group as a whole affects their own 
lives" (Dawson 1994, 76). This group linkage is directly related to the 
historical struggles of African Americans in the United States. The 
struggles have played out in such a way that members of the group 
perceive that neither their life chances nor their ability to influence 
the allocation of political goods is determined by their individual 
standing. Hence, their history of economic subjugation and political 
disfranchisement yields a sense of common fate. The singularity of 
this expression of linked fate trumps even socioeconomic character- 
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istics that one might expect would predict variations in behavior 
(Dawson 1994; Tate 1993). 
African American Public Opinion and 
Partisan Identification 
A Liberal Bias in Black Opinion 
This notion of linked fate also serves as the basis for the fairly con- 
sistent strivings for inclusion and socioeconomic development in 
African American public opinion. Following Dawson's reasoning, we 
should expect that African American opinion is likely to deviate 
considerably from that of whites. And that is the case-African 
Americans and whites define their political interests in divergent 
ways and perceive different relationships to public authorities and 
institutions. 
Table 4.1 compares opinion among Blacks and whites on various 
issues. A variety of issues have been selected, some of which relate to 
the key concern of Blacks, namely, racial inclusion. Others relate to 
issues that may be thought of as reflecting a liberal-conservative con- 
tinuum. Between 1986 and 1992 the greatest differences between the 
two races appeared on the issue that was of most concern to Blacks- 
racial policy. Blacks, as one of the groups most vulnerable to down- 
ward shifts in the economy, were almost twice as likely as whites to 
favor a government guarantee of employment opportunity. There 
was an even greater divergence on a role for government in guaran- 
teeing school desegregation (almost 83 percent of Blacks, compared 
with about 36 percent of whites). The differences grew wider and 
wider as the issue of preferential treatment for underrepresentation 
was introduced. And as the issues became further removed from a di- 
rect racial public policy, the gap between the races lessened but re- 
mained significant on most measures. 
However, opinions diverge considerably between the races when 
information about alienation from public institutions and feelings of 
efficacy are taken into account. The different socialization experi- 
ences of Blacks vis-a-vis public authorities produce distinct opinions. 
They are quite skeptical of the government and believe that they 
have far less ability to influence what it does. This cast of opinion 
forms a good deal of the basis for the behaviors we observe among 
African American participants in political affairs. 
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TABLE 4.1 Public Opinion among Blacks and Whites, 1986-1992 (Percent) 
Whites Blacks 
- - 
Race Policy 
Government should ensure equal employment 
opportunity 46.2 89.8 
Government should see to school desegregation 35.6 82.9 
Increase spending on programs that assist Blacks 17.6 74.6 
Government should make special efforts to help 
Blacks 11.9 39.9 
Preferential hiring 15.4 67.7 
College quotas 29.7 79.7 
Implicit Racial Issues 
Increase support for food stamps 18.0 50.9 
Sanctions against South Africa 26.5 45.8 
More assistance for welfare 14.7 32.3 
Solve underlying problems that give rise to urban 
unrest 48.3 71.7 
Oppose capital punishment 14.4 36.9 
Social Spending 
Expand government services 
Increase Social Security 
Federal support for education 
Increase support for Medicare 
Government assistance to the poor 
Alienation from Government 
People like me have no say 13.3 28.3 
Public officials don't care 15.3 29.0 
Distrust government 56.1 74.4 
Government run by big interests 66.0 73.3 
S ounc E: Adapted from Kinder and Sanders 1996, 30. Reprinted with per- 
mission from the University of Chicago Press. 
African American Partisan Identification 
The sources of participation and the opinions of African Americans 
translate into certain general characteristics in partisan identifica- 
tion. Since the United States has one of the strongest two-party po- 
litical systems in the world, political scientists have fairly easily de- 
termined how most citizens identify themselves politically-most of 
the time the population is fairly evenly divided between identifiers 
with the Democratic and Republican parties. Even when the division 
is not fairly even, rarely does one party or the other enjoy a long- 
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TABLE 4.2 Partisan Identification, by Race, 1952-1996 (Percent) 
Democrats Republicans 
Blacks Whites Blacks Whites 
SOUR c E : Adapted from Barker et al. 1999, 216. Reprinted with permis- 
sion from Prentice-Hall. 
term monopoly of partisan supporters in the various local, state, and 
federal election contests. Between 1952 and 1996, for example, in 
only three elections (1952, 1956, and 1964) did the white voting par- 
tisans give more than 55 percent of their support to one party. 
African Americans, however, deviate from that general pattern. They 
tend to identify with one party at a time. Historically, they have 
given well over 60 percent of their support to just one party for long 
periods. Table 4.2 compares the two racial groups' party identifica- 
tion between 1952 and 1996. During this 54-year period, selected 
African Americans identified strongly with the Democratic Party. But 
that was not always the case. The analysis below shows that this pat- 
tern characterized African American partisan identification with the 
Republican Party at an earlier point in history. 
Racially Polarized Voting: An Outcome of 
Racial Exclusion and In-Group Processes 
The racial segmentation of African Americans in public life has often 
produced racial bloc voting. This is a situation in which large num- 
bers of a racial or ethnic group vote for a particular candidate, or in 
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which such a group uses its separate social base to form coalitions 
with other groups. Much objective evidence shows that Black parti- 
san identification and voting occurs in a bloc. But it is equally true 
that the presence of Black candidates in elections often produces bloc 
voting on the part of whites against those candidates (Reeves 1997). 
Both outcomes seem to be consistent with the different realities that 
the races perceive in public life. 
Racially polarized voting, on the other hand, occurs when at least 
two racial groups vote as a bloc for a set of different candidates. One 
can think of polarization as occurring when, given a head-to-head 
contest featuring an African American and a white candidate, the 
whites vote for other whites and the African Americans vote for other 
African Americans. In this scenario, Blacks gain most when they con- 
trol more than a majority of the votes, a condition that obtains for 
most of the electoral seats held by them. But for Blacks there is a dis- 
tinct other side to bloc voting. They have often used their votes in a 
bloc to advance their agenda of racial inclusion. They do this by 
bundling their votes for the party that seems most amenable to their 
agenda, hoping to serve as a counterweight in the two-way contest. 
The group is especially advantaged in this scenario when the compe- 
tition is especially keen between the two parties. This analysis will 
show how the latter has been a feature of African American behavior, 
especially in national contests (Walters 1988). 
There are other aspects to racialized voting that lead to especially 
deleterious effects in the electoral process. Polarized voting can be- 
come problematic when it leads to vote dilution. Davidson (1984) 
states that vote dilution occurs when one group voting as a cohesive 
bloc, either singly or when combined into districts via election laws, 
diminishes the opportunity of another group to elect the candidate 
of their choice. Lani Guinier (1994) invokes James Madison's warn- 
ing about this phenomenon at the founding of the republic: "if a ma- 
jority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will 
be insecure." According to Madison, "the accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of 
one, of few, or many," is defined as tyranny. Guinier goes on to show 
that such a "tyranny of the majority" characterizes the status of 
African Americans in the political process, making them permanent 
losers in the majority-rule system (Guinier 1994, 3-20). 
A classic case of racially polarized voting and probably one of the 
most extreme cases occurred with Jesse Jackson's candidacies in the 
1984 and 1988 Democratic primaries. According to the CBS News 
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and the New York Times exit polls, in 1984 Jesse Jackson received 77 
percent of the African American vote and only 5 percent of the white 
vote. In 1998 he received 93 percent of the African American vote 
and roughly 13 percent of the white vote (Plissner and Mitofsky 
1988). In this case, even when Jackson sought to portray himself as a 
candidate with an all-inclusive platform of broad appeal-his "Rain- 
bow Coalition" of diverse interests-he was unable to attract support 
from the substantial number of whites whose "interests" seemed 
consistent with the "rainbow." Moreover, he continued to appeal to 
all sectors of African Americans, even when the Rainbow platform 
appeared to disadvantage them. 
The racially polarizing effect often occurs in two-party contests, 
even when there is no Black candidate. Walton and Smith (2000) 
have called this the "one-party" dominant effect among Blacks, who 
have historically cast the overwhelming majority of their votes for 
one or the other of the major two parties. During the Reconstruction 
era, they cast their votes overwhelmingly for the Republican Party, 
which had been Lincoln's party. Since the presidency of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, however, Blacks have tended toward the Democratic Party. 
The 2000 election is an illustration. In one of the most controversial 
elections since the 1876 Hayes-Tilden contest, the polarization of the 
African American vote was visible. Hardly anywhere was the polar- 
ization more visible than in the state on which the outcome of the 
contest hinged-Florida. An aggregate-level analysis (using ecological 
regression) of registration data and Florida election returns, by 
county, provides strong evidence of racially polarized voting. These 
results show that African Americans overwhelmingly supported A1 
Gore, with 96 percent of their vote, compared with only 4 percent 
who supported Bush. Approximately 56 percent of whites, on the 
other hand, supported George Bush, while roughly 44 percent sup- 
ported Gore. 
Political Behavior in 
the Colonial and Slavery Periods 
To be sure, African Americans have been disfranchised from the po- 
litical process for most of their time in America. However, since the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 they have made consider- 
able advances. In the words of the southern Baptist preacher, "We 
ain't where we want to be, we ain't where we ought to be, but thank 
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God we ain't where we was!" Election rates of African Americans still 
lag far behind their percentage of the population. African Americans 
constitute roughly 12 percent of the population but account for only 
7 percent of the members of Congress (Davidson and Oleszek 2002, 
127). Nevertheless, the past several decades have seen minority en- 
franchisement translated into the election of significant numbers of 
minority representatives at the local, state, and national levels. An 
overview of the evolution of African American political participation 
is provided below. 
Petitions and Protests 
African American political behavior began in colonial America, when 
the population was small, and before there were clear organized po- 
litical factions. Political expression came from free Blacks located 
mostly in the New England states, where slavery was less prevalent. 
In some of these states a small number of Blacks were granted the 
franchise well before the Civil War. For example, in 1783 a Mas- 
sachusetts court ruled that Blacks who paid taxes were entitled to the 
franchise (Aptheker 1951). By 1840 African Americans were granted 
the right to vote in only a few northeastern states-Maine, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, and Massachusetts; they could also vote in Rhode 
Island and New York, but with property qualifications (Wesley 1944). 
In the state of New York, for example, Blacks were granted suffrage if 
they owned "at least two-hundred fifty dollars' worth of property" 
(Walton 1972b, 21). 
In the early history of the fledgling colonies, it is not easy to iden- 
tify political behavior in the classical sense among African Ameri- 
cans, given their small numbers. What we do know is that those who 
had the franchise sought to exercise it in their perceived interest and 
that they did so by aligning with other organized interests insofar as 
these existed. Others who were free but disfranchised also sought to 
act on the system to attain or restore the right of formal participa- 
tion. But what is perhaps most remarkable is that the overwhelming 
tenor of early African American political behavior was defined by the 
fact that the majority of Blacks were in slavery. That meant that 
African American political expression was overwhelmingly directed 
toward the attainment of universal freedom. Hence what was seen in 
the way of political behavior, even in this early period, was often in 
the form of protest. 
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Both slaves and free persons, with or without franchise, first ex- 
pressed themselves in the form of petitions protesting slavery and de- 
manding racial freedom. Later, those who were free or franchised as- 
sociated themselves with the inchoate faction that seemed most 
agreeable to the inclusion of African Americans in the political com- 
munity. No slave's voice matched that of the poet Phillis Wheatley, 
who desired liberty despite apparent good treatment by the Boston 
family that owned her. In 1773 she addressed a poem to the king's 
secretary of state in the colonies expressing a desire that no one 
should experience tyranny, not even she, a slave (Fishel and Quarles 
1967, 37): 
Should you, m y  lord, while you peruse m y  song, 
Wonder Porn whence m y  love of Freedom sprung, 
Whence flow these wishes for the common good, 
By feelings heart best understood, 
I, young in life, by seeming cruel fate 
Was snatch'd fi-om Afi-ic's happy seat 
W h a t  pangs excruciating must molest, 
W h a t  sorrows labour in m y  parent's breast? 
Many other slaves who petitioned for freedom joined Wheatley's 
pliant call. Among them was a group in Boston in 1773 that peti- 
tioned the Massachusetts legislature for freedom using the rhetoric of 
the colonists who declared their own intent to fight against the 
tyranny (which the petitioners dubbed the equivalent of slavery) of 
England. The petition by the Blacks was issued on behalf of "our fel- 
low slaves in this province, and by order of their Committee" (Fishel 
and Quarles 1967, 45). (The entire text of this petition is reprinted in 
chapter 2.) 
Early Federalist Partisan Leanings 
Meanwhile, Blacks who had the franchise and voted sought out or- 
ganized groups and allies that were opposed to slavery. Such groups 
varied from state to state, but those with whom Blacks were aligned 
were located in the Northeast and tended to be members of the busi- 
ness classes-merchants and such whose incomes were not derived 
from a plantation economy. They were the forerunners of the Repub- 
lican Party with which Blacks aligned after emancipation. In the 
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early days of partisan factions in the state of New York, for example, 
free voting Blacks aligned with the Federalists, largely a group of 
wealthy men who were thought to be opposed to slavery. That group 
would go through several different names before settling on the Na- 
tional Republicans (distinguished from the Jeffersonian Republicans, 
who favored maintenance of slavery). 
Elsewhere in the Northeast were similar factions, and Blacks gravi- 
tated to those that took a position favoring the abolition of slavery. 
But this was not the only issue that animated Blacks in the colonial 
period. They were also interested specifically in issues related to the 
franchise. Recall that the franchise was limited not only for Blacks 
but also for Americans in general who did not own substantial prop- 
erty. Thus the expansion of the franchise was a major issue on which 
most of the emerging partisan groups took a position. Blacks tended 
to associate themselves with those who supported the expansion of 
the vote. Their reasoning was simple-they could gain additional 
rights only by supporting the broadening of the electorate for all. To 
this end, Hanes Walton shows that Blacks supported the Whigs in 
New Jersey, "anti-masonry, Whigs, and liberals" in Pennsylvania, and 
the lingering remnants of the Federalists in New York and New Eng- 
land (Walton 1972b, 26-27). 
Black Third-Party Efforts: A Case Study 
As we have seen, long before African Americans gained the franchise, 
they sought to influence the fortunes of the race through political ac- 
tion. Since the barriers of slavery militated against routine participa- 
tion, Blacks often sought alternative routes. One of these was action 
through a third political party. They sought third-party leverage both 
through coalitions with whites who organized outside the major par- 
ties and through independent Black political parties. The linkages 
with others remained available at first, because before the Civil War 
some interests continued to challenge the emerging Democratic and 
Republican dominance. Sometimes these third parties were especially 
appealing because they opposed slavery. Such an option was espe- 
cially attractive if neither of the emerging two dominant parties ad- 
dressed the race-inclusion agenda. Just as often, independent Black 
political parties were utilized for the same purpose-when Blacks felt 
locked out of the routine vehicles for political expression, they some- 
times developed their own race-exclusive alternatives. In all cases, 
the efforts were designed as leverage in a political environment 
Participation in Electoral Politics 195 
where there were often outright barriers to full community member- 
ship, or societal ambivalence about the exercise of this membership. 
The third-party option formed an important and enduring race in- 
clusion strategy because of its potential to disrupt or exact benefits 
from the two major parties. This strategy has been most visible and 
evident in presidential politics (Walters 1988), but, as shown below, 
it has also had a significant influence on local politics when other av- 
enues were closed. 
One of the early efforts of Blacks to choose a third party came in 
1840, when some among them were first attracted to the Liberty 
Party, an organization that was almost exclusively dedicated to the 
abolition of slavery (Walton 1972b, 81). They were on one side of a 
split antislavery movement that sought to use the churches for re- 
lentless efforts to abolish slavery. The party, like several other anti- 
slavery organizations, had little success at the national level. How- 
ever, the Liberty Party actually had several national conventions and 
fielded a presidential candidate in the 1840 and 1844 elections 
(Franklin and Moss 1994, 176). Blacks participated as delegates and 
were generally supportive of this essentially antislavery party. 
Many Blacks sought to form their own parties during the aboli- 
tionist campaign and after the Hayes Compromise of 1876. The first 
major effort that referred to itself as a movement rather than as a 
party occurred in the 1840s-the Negro Convention Movement (see 
chapter 2). This represented the first effort to organize Blacks on a na- 
tional scale. The movement conducted conventions, where state- 
ments of purpose and the equivalent of racial "platforms" were is- 
sued. They constituted virtually all of the important African 
American spokesmen of the time, whose energies were dedicated to 
putting a racial agenda before the public. Because of the difficulties of 
organization even for free Blacks during the period of continuing 
slavery, the national project proved very difficult to advance. There- 
fore, the movement dispersed a good deal of power and action to 
state-based units of the parent body. Inevitably this meant a weaken- 
ing of the national program, because varying conditions in the states 
hindered concerted action. In the face of the harsh realities of plan- 
tation enslavement for most Blacks and because of discrimination 
and ambivalence elsewhere, this early effort fell into disuse as the 
Civil War approached and the nation was plunged into war. 
With both the Republican and Democratic parties moving toward 
all-white membership, African Americans had no choice but to seek 
alternative parties. In 1890, national organizations such as the Na- 
tional Afro-American League (NAAL), later reorganized as the Na- 
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tional Afro-American Council, encouraged Blacks to participate in 
third-party activities. Although neither of these organizations was 
technically a political party in the sense of office seeking, they some- 
times mimicked one. For example, the NAAL organized several na- 
tional conventions and issued "platforms." However, like so many 
Black organizations, it was focused first and foremost on the funda- 
mental acquisition and protection of equal rights, and it was fairly 
decentralized in organization. The league had an interest in influenc- 
ing politicians, to be sure, but possession of rights was a prior condi- 
tion (Walton 1972a, 49). These efforts appeared to be futile, however, 
as racially polarized voting defeated Black third-party candidates at 
every turn. For example, the local Ohio state-organized Negro Pro- 
tective Party unsuccessfully ran a candidate for governor in the 1897 
election (Walton 1972a, 51). The party was unable to win the office 
or to have much influence on the platforms of other major con- 
tenders. 
Political Participation during Reconstruction 
The end of the Civil War brought about a series of laws, acts, and ex- 
ecutive orders aimed at bridging the equality gap between whites and 
former slaves. After passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, 
African American men were granted the right to vote for a brief pe- 
riod during Reconstruction. The greatest impact was felt in the 
South, where over 90 percent of the Black population resided. Be- 
tween 1869 and 1976, two Blacks were elected to the U.S. Senate and 
fourteen to the House (see chapter 5). 
Although Blacks did not dominate politics throughout the South, 
white southerners saw them as a threat to their political and eco- 
nomic hegemony. As a result, white southerners began to employ 
various intimidation methods aimed at discouraging Blacks from par- 
ticipating in the political process. Such methods ranged from mob vi- 
olence and lynching to economic sanctions. These methods, both vi- 
olent and nonviolent, were tolerated by the North because both the 
public and political leaders lost interest in the fate of the freed Blacks 
or simply grew weary of the struggle. 
In 1876 an election compromise abruptly ended Reconstruction. 
During the presidential election of 1876, white Democrats in the 
South bolted from their party in support of the Republican candi- 
date, Rutherford B. Hayes. In exchange for the southern white vote, 
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Hayes agreed to remove northern troops from the South. With the 
removal of northern troops came the end of Black political participa- 
tion and political representation in the South. Through intimidation 
and Jim Crow laws, African Americans in the South were denied the 
vote for another century. It was only in 1965 that the Voting Rights 
Act eliminated the blatant disfranchisement of African Americans. 
The Republican Party Identification: 
The Legacy of Lincoln 
According to Dianne Pinderhughes (1 98 7, 1 13), African Americans 
tend to support the political party that is "most supportive of racial 
reform." In 1840, Blacks were faced with the dilemma of supporting 
a third party or one of the major parties. The Liberty Party was an un- 
compromising party of abolitionists and their supporters. The two 
major parties were the Whigs and the Democrats. The philosophy of 
supporting one of the major parties was that, although they would be 
supporting "the lesser of two evils . . . [it would] . . . prevent a greater 
evil." In other words, Blacks could become the "balance of power" 
between the two major parties, thus gaining respect in politics. Those 
adopting this philosophy supported the Whigs over the Democrats 
(Walters 1988). 
The conflict over slavery brought a new party alignment. Aboli- 
tionists and proslavery factions split the Whig Party. By 1860 the 
Whigs disappeared and a new party, the Republicans, emerged. The 
new party came to have the abolition of slavery as a major feature of 
its platform. African Americans quickly identified with this project 
and gave strong support to this party, an affiliation that lasted far be- 
yond Reconstruction. 
Similarly, the emergence of Abraham Lincoln as the party's 
standard-bearer gave him a large following among Blacks. After Lin- 
coln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, African Americans 
barely separated the man from the party, dubbing the organization 
"the Party of Lincoln." This continued support was well justified, be- 
cause the party also led the way in Congress by supporting the pas- 
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the "Civil War Amend- 
ments"-the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. In 
an 1872 speech to a group of Black voters during a convention in 
New Orleans, the abolitionist orator and Republican appointee Fred- 
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erick Douglass summed up this partisan affiliation as follows: "The 
Republican party is the deck, all else is the sea." Walton and Smith 
(2000) interpret Douglass's remarks to mean that only that party was 
willing to address the issues that confronted the African American 
community. 
African American Electoral Behavior in 
Presidential Elections, 1 868- 7 876 
African American political behavior at the time thus could be char- 
acterized as solidly identified with the Party of Lincoln. Then, as 
now, the two-party variant in the general population did not fit the 
alignment of African Americans, who tended to find only one party 
amenable to their human and welfare rights agenda-universal 
freedom (Walton and Smith 2000). This early African American 
behavior can be sketched by looking at voting returns for presi- 
dents in the southern states during the Reconstruction years 
(1868-1876). 
Table 4.3 summarizes the popular vote in presidential elections by 
party in this period, when African Americans first gained the fran- 
chise in large numbers in the areas where their population was con- 
centrated. These determinations are based on the success of the Re- 
publicans in these states because of the heavy identification of the 
new Black voters with that party. The overwhelming sentiment in the 
other southern states was for two third parties, the Southern 
Democrats and the Constitutional Union. This illustrates the special 
character of the region vis-5-vis the rest of the nation, which was 
largely divided between Democrats and Republicans. In 1864 none of 
these eleven states participated in the election, having seceded from 
the Union. 
By 1868, when seven of these states had returned to the Union, 
the presence of African American and other Republicans completely 
shifted the partisan affiliation of the region. These seven states were 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, North and South Carolina, 
and Tennessee. Only Georgia and Louisiana did not vote for the Re- 
publican candidate, Ulysses Grant. Between 1868 and 1880, only 
Georgia and Texas never supported a Republican candidate for presi- 
dent. Thus in this small window of opportunity, Black voters had a 
major role in determining the presidential winners for at least two 
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TABLE 4.3 Partisan Popular Votes for President in Southern States, 
1868-1 880 (Percent) 
Alabama Republican 
Democratic 
Greenback 
Arkansas Republican 
Democratic 
Greenback 
Florida 
Georgia 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
Republican 
Democratic 
Republican 
Democratic 
Republican 
Democratic 
Republican 
Democratic 
Republican 
Democratic 
Greenback 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Republican 
Democratic 
Republican 
Democratic 
Greenback 
Texas Republican 
Democratic 
Greenback 
Virginia Republican 
Democratic 
SO u R c E : Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections, 4th ed., 2001, 
655-658. Reprinted with permission. 
campaigns, those of 1868 and 1872. Their influence was short lived, 
as disfranchisement efforts were under way throughout the region as 
result of the resolution of the 1876 presidential election. Already, 
however, that year only Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina re- 
mained under Republican control (see Table 4.3). 
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State- Level Electoral Behavior during Reconstruction 
However, voting in local elections was an equally important indica- 
tor of the behavior of African Americans. This new class of citizens, 
only recently slaves and many exercising the franchise for the first 
time, voted in massive numbers. During Reconstruction, African 
Americans were especially successful in electing their candidates of 
choice throughout the South-usually Blacks. During this era these 
African American voters, almost always from districts where they 
held the majority, elected not just African American officials but al- 
ways Republicans. Ultimately Blacks controlled approximately 15 
percent of all elected seats in the South. 
In the states where the African American proportion was the 
largest, the Black voters exercised a greater influence. South Carolina, 
with its majority-Black electorate, sent six representatives to 
Congress, Alabama sent three, and Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, and North Carolina each sent one representative during Re- 
construction. Mississippi alone elected senators, sending two to 
Washington. 
African Americans continued to strive to send their own to office 
even as the white Democratic Party regained its hegemony. For ex- 
ample, Mississippi's lone Black congressman, John R. Lynch, ran re- 
peatedly after his term ended in 1877, with his vote totals declining 
in each successive contest against the white Democratic candidate. 
The historical evidence indicates that the decline in support for 
Lynch can be directly linked to the growing coercion and intimida- 
tion of his Black constituents. In 1868, Black constituents had a far 
higher voter registration rate than whites (97 percent for Blacks and 
81 percent for whites). By 1892, registration rates had diminished 
dramatically, especially for Blacks, to the extent that the Black vote 
was of no consequence to election outcomes. Although whites were 
registered at a rate of 56 percent, less than 6 percent of Blacks re- 
mained registered (McMillen 1990, 36). 
Reconstruction in South Carolina: 
Black over White-A Case Study 
During Reconstruction, South Carolina potentially represented the 
best of all possible worlds for African Americans-it was a majority- 
Black state that, with the obliteration of slavery, could become Black 
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ruled. The level of African American participation in electing Blacks to 
office there exceeded that in all other states. However, it cannot be 
said that South Carolina, or any other state during Reconstruction, 
constituted Black rule. South Carolina did nevertheless exhibit a vast 
array of participation that gives an excellent view of what racial group 
sentiments were regarding public policy having to do with African 
American advancement and integration into the larger society. 
The pattern of political action on the part of the Black citizenry 
was organized very early in response to the as yet unimplemented 
emancipation. Although local whites were seeking to undermine the 
Union success in the war, Blacks were organizing a race-exclusive po- 
litical organization, a virtual parallel of the white Democratic Party. 
In 1865 they organized a statewide convention and appealed to the 
former Confederates for inclusion in political affairs. Alone they were 
unsuccessful, requiring the assistance of the Freedmen's Bureau and 
the Union military to implement the emancipation. However, their 
strategy provided a modal example of the African American struggle 
for political inclusion. Since they could not extract inclusion from 
their white counterparts in reasoned discussion, they resorted to the 
mobilization of the race for political action. They did not do so in or- 
der to structure a racialized regime, but rather as the means for get- 
ting what they deemed their share of benefits from the political sys- 
tem. In their particular context they had significant bargaining chips. 
When the Union forces upheld the emancipation directive, Black 
participants went on to significantly influence the direction of the 
Reconstruction-helping to rewrite the Constitution and electing 
their own to office. 
The role of Black allies in the form of the Union army and the 
Freedmen's Bureau was considerable. In February 1865, General 
William Tecumseh Sherman and the Union forces burned about a 
third of the city of Columbia, South Carolina. Charleston was aban- 
doned on the same day and was taken over by northern troops. 
Shortly afterward, the U.S. flag was again seen flying over Fort 
Sumter. This marked the beginning of the Reconstruction era in 
South Carolina. 
In a case study of Edgefield County, South Carolina, Vernon Bur- 
ton (1978) states that the Freedmen's Bureau, backed by federal 
troops, was instrumental in providing protection for Blacks during 
Reconstruction. In other words, whites were no longer allowed to 
commit crimes against Blacks without being punished. Burton re- 
ports that by 1867, 4,367 Blacks and 2,507 whites were registered to 
vote in Edgefield County. As a minority, whites felt that their politi- 
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cal and economic hegemony was threatened and would diminish. In- 
deed, Burton quotes a Democratic leader, George Tillman, as stating, 
"Once [you] grant a negro political privileges. . . you instantly ad- 
vance his social status." 
At the outset of Reconstruction, Unionist Benjamin F. Perry served 
as governor of South Carolina and sought to write a new state con- 
stitution. The primary purpose of this new constitution was to repeal 
that written by ex-Confederate leaders, which included the infamous 
Black Codes, laws that were passed to relegate Blacks to second-class 
citizenship. A referendum was held on whether to have a convention 
to rewrite the state's constitution. Among the 128,056 persons regis- 
tered to vote, approximately 60 percent were Black (Holt 1977). With 
roughly 85 percent of Blacks turning out to vote, they were instru- 
mental in voting for a convention (Walton 1972a). Among the 124 
delegates elected to rewrite the constitution, seventy-six were Black 
(Walton 19 72a). 
The delegates wrote a constitution that eliminated barriers to suf- 
frage for Black men and quickly led to Black political representation. 
From 1868 to 1876, 255 Blacks were elected to state and federal of- 
fices. In the lower house of the state legislature they were able to elect 
eighty-seven Blacks compared with only forty whites. In 1872 they 
were able to elect a Black speaker, and by 1874, Blacks also enjoyed a 
majority in the state senate (Foner 1990). 
The actual political behavior of Blacks in this majority-Black state 
was determined by a variety of factors other than their sheer major- 
ity. Their population majority was significantly leavened by the 
range of allies they developed in the routine processes of politics. 
South Carolina, like many of the other southern states, had a sizable 
group of migrants from the North who entered politics. Many of 
them were Republican businessmen who became a part of the ruling 
class. They became allied with the Black politicians elected from the 
Black-dominated constituencies in the southern part of the state 
("low-country"). In the working relationship that developed, given 
the lack of Black interest in a racialized regime and a lack of eco- 
nomic resources, business interests often formulated more of the 
public policy agenda. And this was not without some cause. The state 
of South Carolina, like many of the other states disrupted by the war, 
was enveloped in a significant economic crisis. This was only deep- 
ened by the necessity of accommodating a Black class of virtual state 
wards. Despite the deployment of the Black vote to elect its own can- 
didates whose views were consistent with the racial inclusion agenda, 
this was not sufficient to overcome economic crisis, efforts of the for- 
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mer Confederates to undermine the new social order, and the am- 
bivalence from the federal government allies. The early Black success 
was therefore short-lived, and the election of Rutherford B. Hayes as 
president in 1876 sealed its fate. A stunning turnabout in fortunes oc- 
curred after 1875, when only two new Blacks were elected to 
Congress from South Carolina. After one Black candidate was elected 
in 1893, it would be another century before another was. In 1895 
South Carolina joined other deep South states in rewriting their con- 
stitution for the purpose of disfranchising Black voters. 
The Collapse of Reconstruction and 
Continued Republican Identification 
African Americans remained on the Republican "deck" even after the 
collapse of Reconstruction with the Hayes Compromise of 1876. Al- 
ready their political success could be attributed almost entirely to fed- 
eral intervention. But once the terms of the compromise were in 
place, Republicans began to move away from policies favorable to 
Blacks. In fact, the party leadership moved the organization toward a 
"Lily-White" party with no interest in maintaining its stable of 
African American supporters in the South. The William McKinley ad- 
ministration (1900) is thought to reflect the moment of complete 
abandonment of this party's southern constituents, then almost en- 
tirely Blacks. McKinley ignored racial issues despite the increase in 
lynchings and race riots in the region. He also failed to address the is- 
sue of disfranchisement. Hence, as Valelly (1993, 31) writes, "the 
South became a 'sea' of disenfranchisement.'' Theodore Roosevelt 
and William Taft followed the lead of Hayes by also adhering to a 
hands-off policy. With the Republican hands-off policy in effect, 
many southern states rewrote their constitutions in a successful effort 
to disfranchise African American voters. Hence, after about 1878 
there was little in the way of formal political expression for most 
African Americans who resided in the now "unreconstructed" South. 
The Nadir of Black Participation and 
the Black and Tan Party Alternative 
There was nevertheless political expression by African Americans in 
this lowest period, or nadir, of systematic political exclusion. Black 
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Republicans in the South maintained their loyalty to the party by es- 
tablishing a race-exclusive satellite organization, the Black and Tan 
Party. Since Blacks were in effect barred from membership in local 
southern organizations, a trend developed whereby the party split 
into two groups, the Black and Tans and the Lily-Whites. The phrase 
"Black and Tans" was first used by Louisiana newspapers to describe 
Black members of the Republican Party (Walton 1975). The phrase 
was also used to refer to the "wide range of skin colors and hues that 
existed with the Black groupings" (Walton 1975, 46). Despite the 
popularity of reference to the organization among newspapers and 
the public, the party regulars never officially recognized it. Neverthe- 
less, it was the means Blacks used for their continuing relationship 
with the national party hierarchy. The dual relationship remained in 
place until well into the 1920s. 
The Designated "Race Leader" as 
Conduit for African American Expression 
Meanwhile, national African American leadership (race spokesmen) 
also served as a significant indicator of the political behavior of the 
racialized community. During this low period of actual voting, the 
race spokesmen became the most important vehicles for expression 
about public life. Initially they were the old-line abolitionists, all Re- 
publicans, who had the ear of presidents and the Republican Party 
hierarchy. For a time Frederick Douglass, by then a diplomat and 
high-level bureaucrat, was the most significant among them. His en- 
trke to the centers of power gave him a powerful voice of protest 
against the disfranchisement in the South, even as he exacted bene- 
fits from a system weighted against his constituency. He played this 
role supporting and consorting with Republican presidents from the 
time of Lincoln until his death in 1895. 
Douglass was both a striking figure and a powerful spokesman for 
race interests. Even as a government official he never ceased to be as- 
sertive in his outspoken views on the !racial condition, denouncing 
"such developments as the suppression of the Negro vote in the 
South, the leasing out of convicts as laborers, the crop-lien system, 
and the prevalence of lynching. He railed against the [anti-civil 
rights] rulings of the Supreme Court." As an example of how impor- 
tant he was to presidents was the role he played in the 1888 cam- 
paign that led to the election of Benjamin Harrison. Douglass was ap- 
pointed the equivalent of a regional campaign manager, being 
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"assigned four key states [where] he took the stump night and day 
despite his seventy years" (Logan and Winston 1982, 185-186). 
An Accommodationist interlude: 
Booker T. Washington 
Douglass was followed by perhaps the single most important race 
spokesperson in African American history-Booker T. Washington. 
Although Washington, regarded as a political conservative, did not 
reflect Douglass's perspective, the two performed essentially the same 
function. Washington, while arguing that he eschewed formal poli- 
tics, nevertheless advised every president in his time and virtually 
controlled the allocation of public benefits to the African American 
community. His publicly articulated view that African Americans 
should eschew politics, accept less than full equality with whites, and 
focus on sustaining their niche of economic southern agricultural 
economy appealed to many whites. It held out the possibility that 
there could be peace while a measured program of racial uplift was 
followed for Blacks. Washington's influence was so important be- 
cause it served to make a safe world for the southern pursuit of com- 
plete political disfranchisement. Even the standard voices of protest 
(e.g., W.E.B. DuBois and the inchoate NAACP) were stymied by 
Washington's presence until well beyond World War I (Harlan 1972). 
African American Migration and 
the Emergence of the New Deal Democratic Coalition 
Although the Black and Tans continued, they represented little of the 
true political behavior of African Americans. The southern region, 
where the party's constituents remained, was completely off limits 
for active or even informal political participation by Blacks. African 
Americans could not vote for Republicans even if any campaigned in 
the solidly Democratic white South. And protest was met with the 
draconian state repression or terror. The death knell for the Black and 
Tan Party came with the election of Herbert Hoover in 1928. During 
his campaign Hoover had worked diligently to secure the support of 
the Black and Tans. Immediately after his inauguration, however, he 
launched a strategy to gain the support of southern whites. In fact, 
he initiated investigations to remove African American party leaders, 
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and he pledged full support for the Lily-White Republicans (Walton 
1975). 
In short, the Lily-White strategy employed by Hoover precipitated 
a significant enough shift in partisan African American identity to 
make the national Democratic Party competitive with the GOP. The 
modest overtures from the national Democratic Party hierarchy that 
accompanied the reelection of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 
1936 brought a sense of hope to the Black community. Among other 
things the New Deal provided some jobs for poor Blacks and eventu- 
ally lay the foundation for their new partisan identification and ex- 
pression. 
African Americans also evinced another kind of political expres- 
sion in response to the disfranchisement in the South. They voted 
with their feet starting after 1890, beginning a long-term migration 
from the South to the urban North. They concentrated in racially 
segregated residential areas in central cities of the industrial North. 
Moreover, many of these southern migrants became enrolled as vot- 
ers on arrival in the cities. It was not long before they constituted ma- 
jority African American districts with the ability to control both local 
and national electoral offices. The earliest identification they exhib- 
ited was with the Party of Lincoln, and their electoral behavior re- 
flected that in the election of their own who were also members of 
the Republican Party. 
Chicago was among the first cities where the political behavior of 
African Americans became important. It was in this machine- 
controlled city where the Blacks elected some of their first represen- 
tatives and exercised considerable influence on some aspects of city 
politics. In tracking mayoral elections from 19 15 to 1939, Pinder- 
hughes (1987, 73) has shown that the partisan alignment of Blacks in 
Chicago was solidly Republican before 1930. In only one mayoral 
contest, that of 1923, did the Democrats draw a majority of the com- 
munity's support. Otherwise the support for the Republicans was 
overwhelming among these constituents, averaging about 70 per- 
cent. The immigrants settled in what was then the city's second ward 
and elected their first alderman in 1915, the Republican Oscar De- 
Priest. It was "very likely that the Negro voters constituted a majority 
of the second ward" even then, since they were 70 percent of it by 
1920 (Gosnell 1935, 74). They used their votes in a bloc to become 
the first area to end the absence of Blacks in national elected posi- 
tions. In 1929 this racially compact area sent Oscar DePriest to 
Congress as a Republican, a seat continuously held by a Black ever 
since. 
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A shift in Black partisan identification became discernible in the 
1935 Chicago election, and later became a stampede. DePriest was to 
be the last Black Republican member of Congress for more than fifty 
years when he was defeated by the Black Democrat Arthur Mitchell 
that year. (Massachusetts elected Senator Edward Brooke in 1967, and 
Connecticut elected Congressman Gary Franks in 1991, but neither 
was from a Black constituency.) Despite the remarkable shift in parti- 
san identification, however, the segregated residential enclave in 
Chicago continued to select Black candidates for a variety of elective 
posts, which eventually resulted in multiple Black congressmen in 
Washington. The community was rapidly evolving from a one-party 
Republican identity to a one-party Democratic identity. 
African American political behavior in Chicago presaged what was 
to happen in other northern cities with similar population concen- 
trations. Hence a racially compact district in Harlem, New York, 
elected Adam Clayton Powell in 1945. It is safe to say that by that 
time the revolution in Black partisan identification had already oc- 
curred in local politics in the urban North. The majority partisan sen- 
timent among these urban voters was in favor of the Democrats. 
Thus when Charles Diggs won a congressional seat in Detroit, Michi- 
gan, in 1955, it was a foregone conclusion that he was a Democrat. 
As we shall see, the concomitant transformation in presidential 
politics evolved a bit more slowly, but it was equally certain; here too, 
the racial community by and large hewed to a single party in the 
two-party system. It constituted the most substantial change since 
the era of Republican Party dominance initiated by Lincoln. The shift 
to Democratic Party identification represented the evolving political 
preference that Blacks maintain to the present. 
The Democratic Party: Post-New Deal Coalition 
To be sure, early traces of the African American movement into the 
Democratic Party can be found in the North during Reconstruction. 
However, strong inroads into the party were not created until the 
New Deal era of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The decrease in support for 
the Republicans owed to what Blacks portrayed as the party's aban- 
donment of its core support for the race against the traditional south- 
ern plantation power hierarchy. This abandonment can be traced to 
1876, when the Republicans acquiesced in the restoration of citizen 
rights for the white planter class. Gradually Blacks calculated that the 
Republican support of states rights for the resolution of such issues as 
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voting, lynching, segregation, and the white primary were funda- 
mentally inconsistent with core Black interests. Increasingly the 
Democrats looked like a more favorable option in their support of 
some of these same core issues. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first 
president to become fairly astute in nurturing this favorable disposi- 
tion among Blacks (Hamilton 19 73, 29 1-296). 
Roosevelt 's "Black Cabinet'' 
Roosevelt was able to lure African American voters with his social 
programs, the creation of the Fair Employment Practices Commis- 
sion, and his appointment of a "Black Cabinet." Roosevelt's Black 
Cabinet consisted of a group of Black civic leaders who were unoffi- 
cially appointed as advisers to the president. He appointed such no- 
table Black leaders as Mary McLeod Bethune, Robert Weaver, William 
Hastie, Eugene Kinckle Jones, John P. Davis, and Walter White as in- 
formal advisers to his administration (Perry and Parent 1995). This 
marked the first time that a U.S. president openly recognized the in- 
fluence and legitimacy of Blacks on the group level. 
These Black leaders were instrumental in beginning the dialogue 
that would lead to fairer governmental practices along all race lines, 
specifically where Blacks were concerned. Although recognized as 
prominent citizens, they held no official power that would permit 
them to directly affect policy-making decisions. However, they were 
able to speak in one voice for the rights of other Blacks. Krislov 
(1967) mentions that the Black Cabinet was often met with criticism, 
and some of the criticism came from fellow African Americans. De- 
spite this criticism, Blacks continued to support the Democratic 
Party. Indeed, in 1936 roughly 85 percent of the Black vote went to 
Roosevelt (see chapter 5). 
The Utility of the Black Vote in 
Two-Party National Competition 
The growth in the fortunes of the Democratic Party can be observed 
by looking at patterns of voting among urban African Americans. 
The second Roosevelt election became the critical contest in starting 
this trajectory. By 1936 the visible appointments of Blacks as bureau- 
crats and as part of an informal cabinet was hardly lost on northern 
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TABLE 4.4 Percentage of Votes Cast for Roosevelt in Selected Majority- 
Black City Wards in the Presidential Elections of 1932-1940 
Detroit Pittsburgh Baltimore Chicago 
Ward 5 7 5 3 14 17 2 3 
SOURCE : Adapted from Walters 1988, 18. Reprinted with permission 
from the State University of New York Press. 
Black voters, segregated in their residential enclaves in the inner 
cities. Moreover, participation levels among these mostly straight- 
ticket voters were often quite high, giving the Democrats some assur- 
ance that the affiliation of local partisans could be translated into 
broader support. 
This broader support was especially sought after in presidential 
contests because of the stability of the Black vote. It could make the 
difference when the rest of the electorate was fairly evenly split be- 
tween the two parties (Glantz 1967, 339). The balancing factor be- 
came more critical because the migration of Blacks to central cities 
greatly accelerated between 1910 and 1930. For example, "the Black 
population in Michigan went from 17,115 to 169,453; Illinois from 
109,049 to 328,927; Indiana from 60,320 to 111,982; and Ohio from 
11 1,452 to 309,304" (Walters 1988, 17). 
Partisan support by Blacks for the Democrats in the first three 
elections involving Roosevelt shows how this kind of balance was 
evolving. The data in Table 4.4 compare Black majority voting 
wards-that is, wards in which 50 percent or more of the popula- 
tion is African American-in four cities in the 1932, 1936, and 1940 
presidential elections. What one observes is that in Detroit and 
Pittsburgh a majority of the wards were already voting for Roosevelt 
by 1932. Even so, the increase from 1932 to 1936 was dramatic- 
more than 20 percent for each election. In the machine-dominated 
cities of Chicago and Baltimore, none of the wards cast more than 
50 percent of the votes for Roosevelt in 1932, although the two 
wards in Baltimore came close. Chicago was less Democratic. By 
1936, clearly both of these cities had moved considerably toward 
the Democrats. All of these wards, in all four cities, were solidly 
Democrat by 1940. 
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The African American Democratic Bloc in 
National Politics 
The Democrats now appeared to be the party of "racial reform." This 
trend continued with the Truman administration. Following the lead 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman appealed to the compas- 
sion of Congress to enact laws that would level the playing field for 
African Americans in the workforce. In 1946 President Truman cre- 
ated the Civil Rights Committee as an attempt to address the grow- 
ing civil unrest of African Americans. Although none of the recom- 
mendations became law during the Truman administration, the 
committee did make several recommendations to curtail racial dis- 
crimination. The recommendations included enactment of a civil 
rights bill; strengthening the civil rights section of the Department of 
Justice; and special training for police officers in handling civil 
rights-related disputes. The proposals also sought to end Jim Crow 
laws and to withhold federal grants-in-aid from public and private 
agencies that practiced discrimination and segregation (Perry and 
Parent 1995). 
When Congress failed to pass substantive civil rights legislation, 
Truman was highly successful in his use of executive orders. In 1948 
he laid the cornerstone for policy that would eventually lead to the 
permanent desegregation of the U.S. armed services. Executive Order 
9981 mandated equal treatment and opportunity for all persons in 
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national 
origin. This executive order came at the end of World War 11, a con- 
flict in which Black military service had generated additional support 
from some legislators as well as the general citizenry. Truman's efforts 
solidified Black support of the Democratic Party and empowered the 
group to make further demands for civil justice. 
Again, the voting behavior of Blacks in central cities foretold the 
trend in growing support for Democratic candidates. The strength of 
these voters was clearly helping to sustain the national majority for the 
Democratic Party. The increased Black population was tipping the bal- 
ance in the urban industrial states, where there was intense two-party 
competition, even as the "Solid South" started to drift (sometimes sup- 
porting favorite sons such as Strom Thurmond in 1948). Table 4.5 lists 
the proportion Democratic in four key midwestern cities between 1948 
and 1956 where the impact of the Black vote was strongest in influ- 
encing the total presidential vote for the Democratic Party. Chicago, 
Detroit, and Cleveland consistently exhibit less competitiveness vis-B 
vis the general population and clearly influence the outcome of con- 
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TABLE 4.5 Percentage of Democratic Voters in Presidential Elections in Se- 
lected Midwestern Cities, 1948-1956 (Percent) 
All Democratic Voters Black Democratic Voters 
City 1948 1952 1946 1946 1952 1956 
Chicago 58 54 48 70 7 5 63 
Cleveland 65 60 55 61 79 63 
Detroit 59 60 62 84 90 84 
St. Louis 64 62 61 68 80 7 5 
SO u RC  E : Adapted from Glantz 1967, 350. Reprinted with permission 
from Charles Merrill. 
tests where the level of competition in the general population is high- 
est-Chicago and Cleveland. But everywhere the greater African Amer- 
ican loyalty to the Democratic Party is striking. 
In 1956, however, there was a temporary national shift in African 
American support from the Democratic Party, as these voters aligned 
themselves with Eisenhower. This shift owed to a number of difficul- 
ties within the fragile Democratic coalition after the Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court case. Once the Court declared the "separate 
but equal" policy dead, the reaction from white segregationist south- 
erners who wanted to sustain the system was dramatic. Because 
many of them remained ensconced in the Democratic Party, the for- 
mer racial moderate candidate Adlai Stevenson had to deal with their 
wrath. He sought to do so by trying to placate and accommodate this 
vital party base. What he achieved in the end was massive desertion 
on the part of northern Blacks, who had also become a vital part of 
the party's base. Enough Black voters shifted their allegiance to also 
temporarily interrupt the party's long-running control of the presi- 
dency. Figure 4.1 clearly illustrates the increase in Black support for 
Eisenhower in 1956. Indeed, Black leaders such as Adam Clayton 
Powell endorsed his candidacy. 
The African American Presidential Vote, 1952-2000 
A case can be made that Black partisan realignment occurred as early 
as 1936, but it was certain by 1964. (Ordinarily political scientists ar- 
gue that realignment is precipitated by one or more critical elections 
that polarize voters on the issues [Campbell 1966; Key 19551). As Fig- 
ure 4.1 shows, Black support for the Democratic presidential candi- 
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FIGURE 4.1 African American Presidential Vote, by Party, 1948-2000 
NOTE: Data are not available for 1964 
S o u RC  E : 1948-2000 National Electibn Study Cumulative Data File 
dates greatly increased between 1960 and 1968. The 1964 election 
perhaps best illustrates the point. Barry Goldwater's position on civil 
rights and his states' rights platform clearly moved African Americans 
away from the Republican Party. After the election campaigns of 
Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson, the distinction between the two 
parties on racial issues was stark. The Democrats became more 
racially liberal, while the Republicans, with the support of southern 
Democrats, became more racially conservative (Scher 199 7). Since 
1964, Black support for Democratic presidential candidates has not 
fallen below 80 percent in a single election. 
The Republican Party Surge in 
Presidential Con tests 
The 1968 election revealed the other side of realignment, the counter 
to the ascendancy of Blacks in the Democratic Party. What was white 
dissonance within the Democratic Party in 1964 became a virtual de- 
sertion by 1968. Indeed,. the shift had inspired Richard Nixon, the Re- 
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publican standard-bearer, to devise a "southern strategy" to attract 
white voters away from the Democratic Party. He did not actually suc- 
ceed, because of the presence of independent candidate George Wal- 
lace (33 percent). However, even with Wallace's strong showing, the 
Republicans took the South (36 percent), outpolling the Democrats (3 1 
percent) (Stanley and Niemi 2000, 118). The realignment improved the 
fortunes of the Republicans in presidential elections considerably. They 
have won six of the nine contests between 1968 and 2000. 
Nixon's conservative platform on busing and education as well as 
his judicial appointments during his early administration ensured 
that African Americans would continue to identify strongly with the 
Democrats. According to Ambeau, Perry, and McBride (1995), the 
Nixon admiriistration represented a retreat from the civil rights ad- 
vances of the Johnson administration. Two distinct policy actions by 
Nixon were clear appendages of his cavalier handling of civil rights 
issues and tend to support the argument that Nixon's administration 
represented a step backward in the struggle for equality. First, Nixon 
ordered the Justice Department to step in and slow down school de- 
segregation. This marked the first time that a U.S. president had or- 
dered the Justice Department to intervene in such a capacity since 
the Brown decision. Historically, the Justice Department worked with 
the proponents of civil rights. Second, Nixon opposed the 1970 ex- 
tension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was due to expire. Al- 
though his efforts were unsuccessful, Nixon was perspicacious in his 
assessment of the benefits the Republican Party would have obtained 
by weakening the protection of Black voting rights (Perry and Parent 
1995). On the other hand, despite his less than favorable civil rights 
record, Nixon did appoint Blacks to subcabinet positions in his ad- 
ministration, with the highest-ranking position being that of an as- 
sistant secretary (Warshaw 1996). 
The next administration was marred by the Watergate scandal that 
unseated Nixon and ushered Vice President Gerald Ford into office. 
Ford also inherited a general public mood that included some mis- 
trust of the Republican Party. If the general public was suspicious 
about the politics of the controlling party, Blacks in America had 
even deeper concerns. The Voting Rights Act, which was a major 
component of the migration of African Americans into the demo- 
cratic processes in the United States, was less than ten years old and 
facing extinction when Ford took office. Like Nixon's, Ford's civil 
rights record was less than favorable among Blacks and other civil 
rights advocates. Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, in 
1975 Ford initially opposed the extension of the Voting Rights Act. 
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jimmy Carter: Leveraging the Black Vote in 
Intense Partisan Competition 
With Ford tainted by the Nixon White House scandal, Jimmy Carter 
was able to prevail in the 1976 election, restoring the Democrats to 
power after an eight-year hiatus. The return of the Democrats owed a 
great deal to the strong African American support for Carter in key ar- 
eas of the country, a fact that perhaps enabled Blacks as a group to 
determine the partisan victor. This view is consistent with a general 
theory of how the Black vote can be used as a balancing agent when 
competition between the two parties is intense. Ronald Walters has 
calculated how the concentration of Black voters in competitive ur- 
ban areas and in the South translated into control of electoral votes 
for Democrats in the 1976 election. According to his analysis, Black 
voters provided the critical balance of votes for Carter in major 
northern, border, and southern states (Walters 1988, 36ff). (See Table 
4.6.) Indeed, during the campaign Carter made significant alliances 
with African American politicians and sought the Black vote by 
evincing a strong interest in some of the core issues associated with 
that community. The general assessment is that the Carter adminis- 
tration "sustained its commitment to civil rights throughout its du- 
ration, unlike the Nixon and Ford administrations, which lapsed into 
dormancy in civil rights enforcement" (Perry, Ambeau, and McBride 
1995, 117). 
Party Realignment in Presidential Elections: 
The Reagan- Bush Victories 
Carter's term was to be a mere interlude for the Democrats. The Re- 
publicans returned to power in 1980 and remained in the White 
House for three terms. Clearly, the New Deal coalition that had been 
heavily oriented to African American core interests had dissolved, 
with the Republican Party becoming much more successful in presi- 
dential contests. In this instance they were able to put together a 
winning coalition by using something akin to Nixon's southern strat- 
egy. They relied on increased support for the GOP among southern 
whites, to the disadvantage of the strong single-party orientation of 
African American voters (Kinder and Sanders 1996). It did illustrate, 
however, that under these conditions, when the intensity of compe- 
tition decreased, Blacks were less likely to determine the outcome of 
national contests. Reagan carried the South in both 1980 and 1984, 
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TABLE 4.6 Presidential Electoral Votes in Selected States, 1976 
Black Voting-Age 
Electoral Vote Population (%) 
North 
New York 41 12.6 
Pennsylvania 27 08.2 
Illinoisa 26 12.4 
Michigana 21 11.3 
New Jerseya 17 10.8 
Ohio 25 08.9 
Region Total 157 
South 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Georgia 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Texas 
Tennessee 
Florida 
Region Total 
Border 
Maryland 10 
Missouri 12 
Region Total 22 
Nationwide 
Total Democratic 297 
Total Republican 240 
a States carried by the Republican Party. 
SO u R c E : Adapted from Walters 1988, 36-3 7. Reprinted with permission 
from the State University of New York Press. 
winning by a landslide 26 percentage points in the latter. Bush also 
prevailed in the South in 1988, by 20 percentage points (see Table 
4.7). 
During these Republican administrations, African Americans per- 
ceived that their core agenda issues were placed on the back burner. 
Ronald Reagan captured the public wave of disenchantment with ag- 
gressive government intervention in the social sector of domestic af- 
fairs, at the same time that he faced an economic recession. Mean- 
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TABLE 4.7 Presidential Electoral Votes, Southern Region, 1964-2000 
Democrats Republicans Independentsa 
a Independent candidates were Wallace in 1968 and Perot in 1992 and 
1996. 
SOURCES: Data from Stanley and Niemi 2000, 118-1 19; Walton and 
Smith 2002, 161. 
while, the conservative wing of the Republican Party that Reagan 
represented also captured control of the party hierarchy. The presi- 
dent thus oversaw the implementation of a conservative agenda that 
aggressively attacked welfare and civil rights issues associated with 
African Americans. Needless to say, the partisan identification of 
Blacks with the Democratic Party only hardened. The Bush adminis- 
tration that succeeded Reagan's was perceived by Blacks to have 
made little change in the policy trajectory. Indeed, Bush's appoint- 
ment of the conservative judge, Clarence Thomas, to the Supreme 
Court (replacing the stalwart liberal Thurgood Marshall), was widely 
seen as an especially egregious reflection of this policy shift (Barker et 
al. 1999, 117). 
Trading Places: From Clinton to Bush 
The White House once again returned to the Democrats in 1992, for 
two terms. And once again, the African American vote proved to be 
of strategic importance as a balance in the South, where about 50 
percent of this population lived. Bill Clinton received overwhelming 
support from African American voters everywhere, but their support 
was especially important in the South. This region was the most in- 
tensely competitive of his two campaigns. And while Clinton did not 
carry the South in either 1992 or 1996, it was his overwhelming sup- 
Participation in Electoral Politics 21 7 
port among Blacks there that counterbalanced whites who remained 
in the Republican fold. The competition, however, intensified be- 
tween the two parties (see Table 4.7). 
A part of what propelled Blacks to mobilize so intensely for Clin- 
ton in 1992 was his promise and the experience of twelve years of Re- 
publican rule. With the help of many African American leaders, Bill 
Clinton campaigned on a promise of diversity and economic reform 
in a way that appeared to reflect the core issues important to Blacks. 
This was fortuitous because even the Blacks who achieved middle- 
class status after the civil rights movement found themselves unable 
to influence the Republican policymakers. Motivated by three terms 
of perceived exclusionary Republican policies, approximately one 
million more African Americans voted in 1992 than in 1988, and 
Clinton received 82 percent of the Black vote (Perry and Parent 
1995). He increased that margin slightly in 1996. Clinton reclaimed 
the White House for the Democrats and announced that he would 
build a White House administration that "looks like America" (War- 
shaw 1996). 
Black skepticism of the Republican Party in the 2000 election rose 
to its highest level since the 1964 election of Lyndon Johnson. In 
large measure it was driven by the same considerations about reflec- 
tion of core African American issues in the Republican platform. 
There was little in the Bush platform that attracted large numbers of 
Blacks. Meanwhile, measuring Bush against the track record of the 
Clinton-Gore administration left African Americans little choice but 
to go with what was deemed a "known" quantity. In this controver- 
sial election the African American electorate gave 90 percent of its 
vote to the Democrats. Ironically, the election outcome hinged on 
the resolution of disputes in Florida about ballot improprieties in 
heavily African American and other Democratic districts. But just as 
important was the level of partisan competition in the balance of the 
South. This region was less competitive than it had been since the 
1988 Bush-Dukakis election (see Table 4.7). 
Post-Civil Rights Local Political Behavior 
African American Behavior in State and Local Politics 
Although national trends are the best indicators of aggregate behav- 
ior on the part of African Americans in the post-New Deal era, local 
behavior clearly remains the base from which it all springs. The 
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power of the local arena in defining how this population behaves po- 
litically remains bound up in the racialized social order. It is of pro- 
found consequence that African Americans have more often than not 
been racially isolated in the political arena. They often live and vote 
in segregated racial districts, and have most often been formally em- 
powered by electing one of their own to represent them. Most im- 
portantly, the continuity of racial discrimination and ambivalence 
about their citizenship status have led them to align with a single 
party that espouses support for improving these circumstances. All 
the consequences of these preconditions for political expression are 
writ large in the local arena, and hence one finds that, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, African American political expression is 
most intense at the local level. 
As noted earlier, when the shift to the Democratic Party began in 
the Roosevelt era, it first became visible in the local wards and 
precincts in central cities. When Blacks were able to elect their own 
at these levels, the shift to the Democratic Party soon reverberated 
upward to presidential contests. In this sense it is not odd that these 
voters seemed most animated by the availability of the likes of De- 
Priest, Diggs, Powell, and others in congressional districts. They 
could combine their votes in these central cities and be assured of a 
representative whose central mission was to regularize the status of 
Blacks in American society. Once these representatives were elected, 
their congressional seats became some of the safest in the nation. 
This pattern of behavior spread across the country as the disfran- 
chisement in the South ended with the civil rights movement. 
African American Voter Registration in 
the Post-Civil Rights South 
What is the evidence regarding the aggregate patterns of behavior for 
Blacks in state and local politics? Since we already have some sense of 
the pattern in the North after the Great Migration, the task is to ex- 
plain how the South completed the picture. In order to do this, we 
have to expand our focus, as the constituent base in the South was as 
much rural as urban. The first important point to be made about po- 
litical behavior among African Americans in the South is that as soon 
as restrictions were removed, they prepared in great numbers to exer- 
cise the franchise. And they had a good deal of ground to make up. 
After all, in 1940, estimates were that no more than 5 percent of the 
Black voting-age population in the region was registered to vote. 
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About the time of the Montgomery bus boycott, barely 25 percent 
were registered. Despite the intensive mobilization that spread 
through the region in 1960, there were still spectacular levels of dis- 
franchisement in some states. Mississippi was the worst in this re- 
gard, with only 6 percent of eligible Black voters registered. The fig- 
ure for Alabama was twice that, with only 13 percent registered. 
The civil rights mobilization and concomitant federal legislation 
had a dramatic effect in increasing opportunities for African Ameri- 
can participation. The increase in the voter registration numbers was 
the first indication. Registration in the South rose precipitously on 
the eve of passage of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting 
Rights Act (1965). In 1964, for example, only Mississippi did not 
show dramatic progress; the proportion of eligible Blacks registered 
was still barely over 6 percent. In Alabama the proportion neared 25 
percent, and in most of the other former Confederate states it was 
well above 30 percent. Tennessee and Florida had already topped the 
60 percent mark. 
The 1965 Voting Rights Act altered the registration rates almost 
immediately. One of its provisions allowed the placement of federal 
registrars in states where barriers to registration had not been imme- 
diately removed. A mere two years after passage of the act, no south- 
ern state had African American registration rates below 50 percent. 
The evidence is incontrovertible that the federal registrars played a 
major role in increasing registration rates in the most egregious cases 
of intimidation and refusal to follow the law. In Mississippi, 61 per- 
cent of the new registrants were enrolled by federal registrars, and in 
Alabama and Louisiana, 48 percent were. In any case, the Black pop- 
ulation was eager in its pursuit of voter registration. 
African American Turnout in the Mobilized South 
The real challenge in evaluating political behavior lies in determin- 
ing actual participation. Did the southern Blacks vote, and what pat- 
terns can be discerned from analysis of voting participation? Once 
again the conventional wisdom that Blacks, with a low socioeco- 
nomic status, will participate less, does not hold. Enfranchised south- 
ern Blacks had some of the highest participation levels in the region. 
A study of rural Black voters in Mississippi discovered that post-1965 
voting was exceedingly high across all socioeconomic levels and that 
such participation seemed much more related to political mobiliza- 
tion in majority-Black districts (Morrison 1987, 174). There is similar 
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FIGURE 4.2 Party Identification among African Americans, 1952-2000 
SO u R c E : 1948-2000 National Election Study Cumulative Data File 
evidence comparing relative racial turnout in presidential elections 
between 1952 and 1972-contests just before and just after the 
height of the mobilization movement in southern cities. Figure 4.2 
shows the dramatic upsurge in turnout of Blacks between 1956 and 
1968. Once Blacks got the franchise back, they turned out to vote in 
presidential elections at rates almost double those for whites. 
As described earlier, the character of this participation can be seen 
in the increased election of African Americans for local, state, and na- 
tional offices and in the support of presidential candidates deemed to 
be supportive of an agenda of racial inclusion. African Americans 
who began to identify with the Democratic Party in the late 1930s 
had turned almost exclusively to that organization by the 1960s. 
They did so because, in a reversal of roles between the two major par- 
ties, the Democratic Party, which had always had a more diverse 
membership, became more supportive of civil liberties, human 
rights, and racial inclusion. In the process, African Americans became 
one of the Democratic Party's fundamental constituent groups. 
The foundation of this national support for Democrats, however, 
rested in the development of local organizations that sponsored 
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Black candidates in mostly majority-Black districts. The availability 
of Black candidates became a major by-product of the intense politi- 
cal mobilization in the South. The participation in the South soon 
matched and then exceeded that achieved by Blacks in the North. 
Just as the Black migrants to northern cities elected their own to lo- 
cal and congressional posts around World War 11, the same pattern 
characterized the South from about 1967. 
Electing Their Own: 
Black Representatives for Black Districts 
The early pattern of political behavior among Blacks showed them 
putting significant energy into electing Black candidates when their 
numbers assured victory. Since voter registration levels were so low, a 
first order of business was mobilization for registration and subse- 
quent political action. Much of this process was carried out by grass- 
roots community organizers. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee in Mississippi is a prime example. In 1973 a massive con- 
tingent of civil rights workers descended on the state with the ex- 
press purpose of increasing Black registration. Among their number 
were hundreds of students, who not only ran registration campaigns 
and freedom schools but also made remarkable use of the national 
media to expand the cause to the general population. Perhaps the 
best signal of what the effort was aiming for was the controversial 
concept of "Black Power." Although the term was widely interpreted 
by the media to mean some kind of Black separatism, chief exponent 
Stokely Carmichael defined it as Blacks using their voting power to 
win allocations from the system. It was conceptually more related to 
the group theory of politics, which suggested that political success 
could be realized only by organizing into a group for the pursuit of 
interests. In the nature of the racialized circumstances, Carmichael 
argued that Blacks were relegated to functioning as a racial interest 
group vis-a-vis other similarly organized interests (Carmichael and 
Hamilton 1967), and it was essentially this model that Blacks fol- 
lowed. 
The result was that the South hewed to a pattern very much like 
that in the North. Living in racially segregated political districts, they 
organized largely by race and selected candidates by race at the local 
level. Coalitions, if they presented themselves, were also used. After 
all, these new citizens, as noted, maintained a high level of action in 
the interest of their preferred presidential and statewide candidates. 
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But the intense action was at the local level. In Atlanta in 1962 Black 
voters sent Leroy Johnson to the state senate, and a few years later 
several southern states had elected Black legislators, mayors, city 
council representatives, and school board members. After 1967 the 
local Black electorates had been especially successful in seating Black 
mayors in small towns. Even a cursory review of the extent of Black 
elected officials (see chapter 5) reveals that the strategy of their con- 
stituents was successful-Black people were electing Black officials to 
represent them all over the South. 
With the help of the Supreme Court, malapportionment in legisla- 
tive districts was undermined in the Reynolds v. Sims (1965) and Wes- 
berry v. Sanders (1964) cases. With the destruction of gerrymandering 
and all manner of racial voter dilution schemes, soon southern legis- 
latures and congressional districts saw Black representatives. Black 
majority congressional districts in Texas (Houston) and Georgia (At- 
lanta) sent the first Blacks to Congress in almost 100 years. The strat- 
egy has successfully been employed in all but the state of Arkansas in 
the South. 
National Black Turnout 
Considering these outcomes along with Black electoral participation 
nationwide, there has been remarkable change and success. Blacks 
are participating at high levels, especially where they have the op- 
portunity to win with a candidate of their own or a candidate sup- 
portive of an agenda for racial inclusion. Nationally, Black voter reg- 
istration has remained around 60 percent, achieving its highest rate 
of 66 percent in 1984 when Jesse Jackson was first a candidate. As 
Table 4.8 shows, in the 1968 election, the Black proportion of the 
voting electorate was 8 percent. In 1996, the proportion was close to 
11 percent-for a group estimated to constitute about 12 percent of 
the general population (Barker et al. 1999, 235). This growth in Black 
voter registration levels has resulted in the highest number of Black 
elected officials and the greatest influence on electoral districts where 
their numbers give them a balance in or control of the electorate. 
From 1970 to 1997 the number of African American elected officials, 
most from majority Black constituencies, increased from 1,400 to 
nearly 9,000. 
Elected African Americans represent districts all over the nation 
and at all levels. At the national level this influence has been exer- 
cised largely within the confines of the Democratic Party in the 
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TABLE 4.8 Black Voter Registration and Turnout in Presidential Election 
Years, 1968-1996 (Percent) 
Turnout 
Registration Rate (%) (% of Total Population) 
1968 66.2 8.0 
1972 65.5 8.2 
1976 58.5 8.4 
1980 60.0 8.9 
1984 66.3 10.1 
1988 64.0 10.0 
1992 63.9 10.0 
1996 63.5 10.8 
SOURC E:  Data from Barker et al. 1999, 235. 
House of Representatives. As Table 4.9 shows, African American can- 
didates are able to win elections in congressional districts almost ex- 
clusively where the majority of their constituents are African Ameri- 
can. This success is seen in all areas of the country. Meanwhile, they 
win more than 50 percent of the time when African Americans are 
the predominant minority group in the district. In 1998, Black ma- 
jority or combined Black and other minority districts (sixty-three) 
elected Blacks to more than half (thirty-two) of the seats. Majority- 
Black electorates controlled twenty-three of those seats. All but Texas 
and Arkansas of the former Confederate states had at least one con- 
gressional representative from a majority-Black district. In Texas the 
lone Black representative represented a Houston district that had re- 
cently slipped below a Black majority. 
The Black Political Party Revisited 
In the long history of the American republic, third-party movements 
have consistently failed to prevail in national contests, and they have 
rarely succeeded when organized at the regional level. Efforts to form 
Black political parties have shared the same fate. However, in the al- 
most unique racial isolation of African Americans from routine influ- 
ence on the two-party structure, there have been repeated efforts to 
form third parties. Perhaps the most visible effort at the national 
level was the Black Political Party Convention in Gary, Indiana, in 
1972. The prime movers behind this event were the Black mayor of 
Gary, Richard Hatcher, Congressman Charles Diggs of Michigan, and 
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TABLE 4.9 Predominantly Minority Congressional Districts and Black 
Seats, 1998 
Description of 
District 
Number of Percent of Seats 
Districts Held by Blacks 
Predominantly Minority 63 
Black Majority 23 
Predominantly Minority (South) 22 
Black Majority (South) 10 
SO u RC  E : Data from Stanley and Niemi 2000, 95. 
the writer Amiri Baraka. Although the meetings over several days 
drew some 5,000 delegates and observers, the effort did not succeed 
in fielding candidates for election or in developing much of a secre- 
tariat (Marable 2000, 635-640). However, regionally based African 
American parties have also continued and have been relatively more 
successful in changing the agenda and sometimes the structure of 
one of the two major parties. The examples below include such par- 
ties in South Carolina and Mississippi. 
The South Carolina Progressive Democratic Party 
The most popular third-party efforts came in the form of what Walton 
(1972a) calls "satellite parties." These were largely state-level organiza- 
tions that sought to parallel local branches of the two regular but seg- 
regated major parties. In most instances the stated aims of these orga- 
nizations or movements were to break down the solidly Democratic 
southern parties, from whose primaries Blacks were barred. The South 
Carolina Progressive Democratic Party (SCPDP) was one of the first 
such organizations to pose a meaningful challenge to a regular state 
political party. It was founded in 1944, the same year that the Supreme 
Court ruled "white primaries" unconstitutional. Also in that year, the 
SCPDP sent twenty-one citizens to the National Democratic Conven- 
tion in Chicago to challenge the seating of the regular Democrats rep- 
resenting South Carolina (Walton 1972a, 72). To their dismay, they 
were not allowed to participate at the convention and were turned 
away. Undaunted, the SCPDP returned to South Carolina and unsuc- 
cessfully ran one of its own members for the U.S. Senate. 
Faltering at electoral success, the party changed strategies. During 
the next two years the SCPDP focused its attention on voter registra- 
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tion drives. They were able to increase the number of registered vot- 
ers from a dismal 3,500 in 1944 to a respectable 50,000 by 1947. Dur- 
ing its annual convention in 1946, the SCPDP decided to end its sta- 
tus as a formal party and to function instead as a caucus concerned 
with uplifting the Black community. Not surprisingly, it was pressure 
from the colossal strength of the two regular parties that caused the 
South Carolina effort to falter. As Blacks were shifting alignment to 
the national Democratic Party, such local efforts were seen as a dis- 
traction. Hence the decision to dissolve was made primarily at the re- 
quest of such prominent leaders as Thurgood Marshall and the Rev- 
erend James Hinton (head of the statewide conference of the 
NAACP). They felt that the organization did not possess enough re- 
sources to unseat the party regulars (Walton 1972a, 72-75). 
United Citizens Party of South Carolina 
In 1969 Blacks in South Carolina formed still another organiza- 
tion-the United Citizens Party (UCP). The primary objective of the 
UCP was to get Black candidates elected. In 1970 and 1972 the 
party ran a slate of candidates at the local, state, and national lev- 
els. They also entered the governor's race in 1970 with a write-in 
campaign for their candidate. This time, with African Americans al- 
most completely identified with the Democratic Party and with dis- 
franchisement in the South reversed, this Black party had a signifi- 
cant influence both in electing candidates and in changing the 
structure of the state Democratic Party. The UCP remained a force 
in electing its candidates in 1970, siphoning off votes from the seg- 
regated state organization. The pressure applied by the UCP forced 
the state Democratic Party organization to appoint an African 
American as assistant director. Subsequently four UCP candidates 
for the South Carolina House of Representatives won endorsement 
by the regular state party. Three of these candidates won in the 
1970 general election. Having achieved at least the partial goal of 
acceptance by the regulars, the UCP disbanded shortly after that 
election (Legette 2000). 
The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party 
The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) was organized in 
the early 1960s in the midst of an intense social movement in the 
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state where racial exclusion at all levels was most prevalent. White re- 
sistance to social change was also perhaps more prevalent and violent 
there too. The MFDP developed from the combined work of all the 
major civil rights organizations in the state-the NAACP, the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Co- 
ordinating Committee (SNCC). The principal target that developed 
over time was the racial exclusion of African Americans from the 
state Democratic Party. In light of the abject conditions of Blacks in 
Mississippi, the organizations formed a confederation, centralizing 
its attack on the status quo. 
Although CORE and the NAACP remained very active, it was 
SNCC that led a grassroots campaign for local community leadership 
development in tandem with voter registration (Carson 1981). Given 
the African American majority voting-age populations in many parts 
of rural Mississippi, increasing voter registration was deemed the key 
to overturning the system. However, as long as Blacks were locked 
out of the Democratic Party, which was the normal vehicle for exer- 
cising political rights, voter registration alone was useless. 
The MFDP was originally settled on as an organizing tool to 
demonstrate the potential of the rural vote to Blacks. But it was also 
used to dramatize the plight of these potential voters to the nation. 
In 1963 and 1964, a summer was dedicated to voter registration and 
a mock election was held that fielded candidates for state and con- 
gressional offices that Blacks could not contest through the regular 
Democratic Party. After succeeding in their efforts at precinct and 
county organization, the MFDP made its boldest move by challeng- 
ing the seating of the regular state party at the 1964 National Demo- 
cratic Convention. The regular party made little pretense of being 
open to Black participation, resolving in its July 1964 convention 
that "we believe the Southern white man is the truest friend the Ne- 
gro ever had; we believe in separation of the races in all phases of 
life" (Southern Exposure 2000, 5 17). 
A week later, 300 people from all over Mississippi attended the Missis- 
sippi Freedom Democratic Party's state convention in Jackson. Unlike 
the regular state party, the MFDP pledged their support to the national 
party, and because of their loyalty, they were convinced they would be 
allowed to represent Mississippi at the Democratic National conven- 
tion. They elected 38 delegates and alternates from their number to 
travel to Atlantic City, with Aaron Henry as chairperson of the delega- 
tion and Fannie Lou Hamer as vice-chairperson. 
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The strength of the MFDP created conflicts for [President] Lyndon 
Johnson, who virtually controlled the convention but feared a walkout 
by the entire South if the Freedom Delegation was seated. He assigned 
Hubert Humphrey, a leader of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, 
the job of defeating the Freedom Delegation. 
Besides putting intense pressure on the members of the Credentials 
Committee to reject the MFDP cause, the president offered a compro- 
mise: the MFDP could have two at-large seats, with the delegates se- 
lected by the president, and a pledge from the National Democratic 
Party never to seat a lily-white delegation again, beginning in 1968. 
The regular Mississippi delegation would be seated after taking a [party] 
loyalty oath. (Southern Exposure 2000, 5 18-5 19) 
The challenge was not won, despite a hearing that brought fa- 
vorable notices from the national audience. The impassioned 
speech of grassroots leader Fannie Lou Hamer, whose limp betrayed 
the racial violence perpetrated against her in rural Mississippi, cap- 
tivated the nation. Her signal rejection of the compromise, how- 
ever, indicated the decision of the MFDP to reject the Johnson com- 
promise. She expressed the sentiment of many of the delegates in 
saying that her burdens in racist Mississippi were worth more than 
two seats (Lee 1999; Mills 1993) and the offer of a partial victory, 
which it rejected. 
However, in another four years the MFDP succeeded in unseating 
the regular delegation at the 1968 convention (Dittmer 1994). There- 
after the remnants of the MFDP, then dubbed the Loyal Democrats, 
effectively supplanted the regular state party and the racially inte- 
grated organization elected an African American as party chairman- 
Aaron Henry. Although the MFDP passed from the scene, this 
movement-cum-political-party was one of the most successful in the 
history of grassroots political participation. Its aim was the destruc- 
tion of the segregated party system and the integration of African 
Americans into the political process, which it accomplished in a mere 
eight years in the most avowedly racialized political structure in the 
states. Aaron Henry and a liberal, integrated leadership fully re- 
formed the old party, whose agenda was subsequently heavily influ- 
enced by the large and highly mobilized African American electorate. 
The new Democratic Party oversaw the transformation of the face of 
political leadership in Mississippi. The state has gone from twenty- 
eight African American elected officials in 1968 to 803 in 1997, the 
largest number in the country. 
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Democratic Party Conventions: 
Black Delegates and Black Presidential Candidates 
A major shift in the influence of African Americans within the Demo- 
cratic Party was indicated in their increased selection as delegates to 
the national conventions. Such delegates inspired the candidacies of 
both Shirley Chisholm and Jesse Jackson. The first dramatic increase 
in their involvement as party delegates happened between presiden- 
tial campaigns of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In 1960 there 
were a mere forty-six Black delegates, but four years later there were 
209. By 1972 they constituted 15 percent of the delegates, and their 
proportion has rarely dropped below that level since. When Jesse 
Jackson ran the second time in 1988, they were 23 percent of the 
convention delegates (see Table 4.10). Moreover, these single-party- 
allegiant Democratic voters have played prominent roles in the out- 
comes of several presidential elections since 1964, where competition 
in the South was especially high-those of Johnson, Carter, and Clin- 
ton. (See chapter 5.) 
Jesse Jackson and the Presidential Primaries 
The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s generated the 
most significant wave of African American social activism and politi- 
cal participation since the Reconstruction. Perhaps the zenith of that 
activism and participation was reached when Jesse Jackson became a 
serious contender for the American presidency, first in 1984 and 
again in 1988. Jackson rode the crest of the most successful social 
movement since the abolition of slavery. As we saw in chapter 2, the 
movement grew from contentious interactions between grassroots 
citizens and the racially exclusively state systems throughout the 
South. Blacks demanded public inclusion and social integration, 
while the white power structure resisted it. The Black resistance, how- 
ever, escalated to a comprehensive challenge to the status quo. In the 
process, the challenge was sustained by significant organized re- 
sources, especially college students and decentralized, largely Baptist, 
church organizations. Leaders emerged within the enormous orga- 
nized networks of students, ministers, and civil rights groups that 
then provided the glue for political mobilization. The most successful 
of these leaders all had an agenda for the elimination of racial exclu- 
sion and discrimination. It was from this network that Jesse Jackson 
sprang as a lieutenant of Martin Luther King Jr. Jackson came to ma- 
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TABLE 4.10 African American Democratic Party Delegates, 19 72-1996 
Number Percent 
SOURCE: Data from Walton and Smith 2000, 147. 
turity only after the death of King, but at a moment when the move- 
ment was already shifting to another phase. 
The new challenge was focused on translating the benefits of social 
mobilization into political gains. Enormous gains had been made in 
the passage of statutes restoring the franchise to Blacks in the South, 
and there seemed to be a national consensus that a public policy 
agenda that included racial inclusion was desirable. Indeed, the first 
signs of the successful campaign for Black Power could be discerned as 
early as 1965, when newly enrolled Black voters elected several of 
their own to local posts in the South. Around the same time, roughly 
in 1967, a new wave of political successes of the African American mi- 
grants to the cities began. Several large industrial cities elected Black 
mayors. In almost all cases in the South and the North, these political 
successes came on the heels of voter registration and mobilization ef- 
forts specifically designed to elect Black candidates. 
The end result was that by 1984 there was a highly mobilized na- 
tional Black electorate. Its size and relatively focused agenda spawned 
Jackson's efforts to seek the presidency using that Black base. By 1988 
he had succeeded in organizing the majority of this racial bloc to 
support his presidential bid in the presidential primaries. Although 
he did not win the Democratic Party nomination, he probably gen- 
erated the highest level of mobilization of Blacks for primary partici- 
pation in U.S. history. Clearly most Blacks saw his candidacy as a sign 
of political achievement. 
The majority of African Americans saw Jesse Jackson's 1984 bid for 
the presidency as a sign of hope. It occurred in a political environ- 
ment in which racial progress had slowed, even within their chosen 
party. Many had taken an economic hit during the Reagan recession, 
at the same time witnessing an increase in economic disparities be- 
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tween themselves and whites. Reagan's 1982 budget cuts included re- 
ductions in a variety of social welfare policies-job training, health 
services, food stamps, and guaranteed student loan programs (Tate 
1993). With about one-third of African Americans living below 
poverty level, these cuts potentially had a disproportionate negative 
impact for them. Although the momentum was still high from the 
Chicago election of Harold Washington in 1983, many African Amer- 
icans remained disappointed at the lack of national Democratic sup- 
port for Washington in that highly visible campaign. Indeed, two po- 
tential presidential candidates, Edward Kennedy and Vice President 
Walter Mondale, endorsed other candidates-Mayor Jayne Byrne and 
Richard Daley Jr., respectively. Jackson would exploit that voter un- 
happiness. 
Although the climate appeared to be right for an African American 
bid for the presidency, there were some strong reservations and op- 
position to Jackson's candidacy. Among Blacks, some high-profile 
leaders, such as Coretta Scott King, Martin Luther King Sr., and An- 
drew Young, endorsed Vice President Mondale. They accepted the 
view that Jackson was unable to win and was thus a distraction. In 
addition, they, like many white party cadre, feared that Jackson's 
candidacy would propel more white voters toward the Republican 
Party. Many African American leaders also questioned Jackson's lack 
of political experience compared with other potential Black candi- 
dates. They felt that a more attractive candidate was needed to chal- 
lenge a strong Republican incumbent. 
Jackson's efforts were further weakened when an African American 
reporter of the Washington Post leaked information to a colleague 
claiming that Jackson had referred to Jewish Americans as "Hymies" 
and referred to New York City as "Hymietown." After initially deny- 
ing the report, Jackson was forced to apologize to the Jewish com- 
munity for his comments. This and the other combination of ele- 
ments led Democratic leaders, both Black and white, to support 
Walter Mondale for the party's nomination. 
Notwithstanding the damage done to his reputation with the Jew- 
ish community, Jackson was able to capitalize on his charismatic per- 
sonality by "making news" (Walters 1988, 170). He operated on a 
budget roughly a third of those of other Democratic candidates (Tate 
1993)) yet he made headlines. One such event occurred when he 
helped in the repatriation of a Black Navy flier, Lt. Robert Goodman 
Jr., who had been captured and imprisoned by the Syrian govern- 
ment. Later Jackson received favorable coverage of a proposal for a 
humanitarian immigration policy while in Mexico and in asking the 
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USSR not to boycott the Los Angeles summer Olympic Games during 
a visit with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Do- 
brynin (Walters 1988). These high-profile acts showed him not only 
to be capable of making the grand gesture but also of having keen ne- 
gotiating skills and a command of broad national issues. 
Given that there was some clear opposition to Jackson's bid for the 
presidency, he had to first legitimize his efforts. He began this effort 
by forming an exploratory committee headed by Mayor Richard 
Hatcher, whose earlier election to the mayoralty of Gary, Indiana, 
made him a powerful symbol of the promise of racial mobilization. 
In doing so, Jackson attempted to convey the message that he or 
some other Black candidate would compete for the Democratic nom- 
ination (Walters 1988). His aims seemed to be endorsed by the grass- 
roots African American population, if not by the Black hierarchy in 
the Democratic Party. The nation's most popular Black magazine, 
Ebony, reported that 67.1 percent of its subscribers granted approval 
to the idea of a Black running for president, and that 61.6 percent ap- 
proved of Jackson's candidacy (Walters 1988). Other nationwide polls 
indicated that Jackson also was popular among white voters (Walters 
1988), but clearly the driving force of his candidacy was that he 
could mobilize his African American base. Meanwhile, voter registra- 
tion levels among Blacks during the 1984 election season were the 
highest they had been since the 1968 presidential contest, which suc- 
ceeded the 1965 Voting Rights Act (Walton and Smith 2000, 168). 
With the stage set for Jackson to compete for the party's nomina- 
tion, the next step was to mobilize financial support. Like so many 
other Black politicians before him, Jackson turned to the Black 
church. As a Baptist minister and consort of Martin Luther King, 
Jackson had immediate entrke to that vast network of powerful cler- 
gymen and their congregations. He received an important endorse- 
ment from the Reverend T. J. Jemison, then president of the National 
Baptist Convention U.S.A., Inc., which possessed a congregation of 
some 6.8 million members (Walters 1988). But even more critical was 
Jemison's formidable organizing skills, which he had first demon- 
strated in the successful execution of the bus boycott in Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, in 1953. He deployed those skills in the interest of Jack- 
son's campaign, mobilizing Baptist clergy all over the country. Other 
denominations followed suit. Jemison was able to garner the support 
of the Reverend J. 0. Patterson, primate of the Church of God in 
Christ, a fast-growing sect of Pentecostal churches. Patterson served 
as the representative of almost 4 million Black churchgoers, for ex- 
ample. 
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One of the most notable strategies Jackson adopted in the 1984 
campaign was his effort to establish the Rainbow Coalition. Pinder- 
hughes (1988) states that the Rainbow idea was first implemented by 
Me1 King in his campaign for mayor of Boston. According to Walters, 
"care was taken to assure that the coalition was comprised of three 
categories of representatives: male and female, ethniclracial, and is- 
sue representation" (1988, 166). Indeed, special efforts were made to 
include Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Although this type 
of strategy was probably necessary for a presidential campaign, it did 
have its downside. According to Pinderhughes (1988), it forced Jack- 
son to deal with a broader set of issues, which made the campaign a 
much more complex process. 
Just how effective was Jackson in generating African American par- 
ticipation for his candidacy in 1984? Although he was a favorite 
among Black voters, he was unable to garner unanimous support. 
Among Blacks voting in their state's caucus or primary, approximately 
55 percent voted for Jackson (Tate 1993, 138). And even though Jack- 
son campaigned on a "bottom-up" theme, poor people and less- 
educated Blacks were less likely to support his candidacy. Tate (1993) 
argues that poor Blacks may have been so hard hit economically dur- 
ing the Reagan administration that they felt compelled to support a 
candidate who had the potential to win the general election. 
Once the dust cleared, Jackson finished third behind Walter Mon- 
dale and Gary Hart. However, as the data in Table 4.1 1 reveals, Jackson 
make an exceptional showing in a campaign where Mondale, one of 
the strongest party insiders, was the presumptive nominee. Mondale 
had been a prime prospect for the presidency for many years, first 
achieving notice as a senator from Minnesota. He had also been elected 
as Jimmy Carter's vice president in 1976 and had been selected again 
for that slot in the failed 1980 contest. Senator Gary Hart, too, was a 
formidable candidate, actually remaining the front-runner for almost 
half of the primary season. Yet Jackson carried more than 20 percent of 
the vote in every primary state in which Blacks constituted more than 
20 percent of the population and states that had major cities with sub- 
stantial Black populations. These were largely southern states and 
highly urbanized industrial northern states. Under the most competi- 
tive circumstance, in which a sitting vice president and an equally at- 
tractive candidate from the Senate were seeking the party's nomina- 
tion, Jesse Jackson was able to significantly mobilize African American 
voters, placing first in Louisiana and the District of Columbia. He 
placed second in the highly competitive state of Maryland, where the 
primary was conducted in May, late in the season. 
TABLE 4.1 1 Jesse Jackson Votes by State in the 1984 Presidential Primariesa 
Black Percentage 
of State Population, 
Votes Percent Position 1980 
New Hampshire 5,311 
Vermont 5,761 
Alabama 83,787 
Florida 144,263 
Georgia 143,730 
Massachusetts 31,824 
Rhode Island 3,875 
Illinois 348,843 
Connecticut 26,395 
New York 355,541 
Wisconsin 62,524 
Pennsylvania 264,463 
District of Columbia 69,106 
Tennessee 81,418 
Louisiana 136,707 
Indiana 98,190 
Maryland 129,387 
North Carolina 243,945 
Ohio 237,133 
Nebraska 13,495 
Oregon 37,106 
Idaho 3,104 
California 546,693 
Montana 388 
New Jersey 159,788 
New Mexico 22,168 
South Dakota 2,738 
West Virginia 24,69 7 
Total 3,282,431 
a Other serious contenders for more than half of the primary season 
(February through June) were Walter Mondale (38 percent), Gary Hart (35 
percent), and George McGovern (2 percent). 
States are listed in order of the dates the primaries were held. 
Write-ins, where 83 percent of voters expressed no preference. 
SOURCES: Data from Congressional Quarterly Guide to U.S. Elections, 4th ed., 
1994, 372-377; Salzman et al., Encyclopedia ofAfrican American Culture and 
History, vol. 5, 1996, 3032. 
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Although Jackson finished third in the 1984 primary, his bid in 
1988 appeared to have more favorable circumstances. With improved 
name recognition and a more issue-oriented campaign, he set his eyes 
on the Democratic nomination. Jackson's candidacy was aided when 
one of the potential front-runners, Gary Hart, dropped out of the race. 
Moreover, the presumptive favorite for the nomination was not a party 
insider, as Mondale had been in 1984. At the same time, more pri- 
maries were being held. The number of states holding Democratic pri- 
maries increased from twenty-eight in 1984 to thirty-five in 1988. 
Jackson finished second in 1988 behind front-runner Michael 
Dukakis. Compared with his 1984 campaign, he more than doubled 
his votes and nearly tripled the number of delegates he received at 
the national convention. This increase in delegate support may have 
been a function of the decrease in the threshold necessary to win del- 
egates from 20 percent to 15 percent (Smith 1990, 221). His support- 
ers were very similar to those who supported him in 1984. His 
strongest consisted of middle-aged and college-educated Blacks, 
while those without a high school diploma and older Blacks were less 
inclined to support him. 
The data in Table 4.12 illustrate the spectacular increase in the 
mobilization and participation levels of African Americans between 
the 1984 and 1988 campaigns. They also indicate a certain degree of 
success of the Rainbow Coalition concept. In 1988 Jackson carried 
five southern states and the District of Columbia, all with substantial 
African American constituents. Even more remarkable was that he 
held second place in twenty-four states, including all of the major 
population centers across the country. Again, registration among 
African Americans was about equal to that of 1984 and 1968. Their 
turnout on election day was higher still, enabling African Americans 
to influence outcomes far beyond their numbers. At the same time, 
Jackson's Rainbow Coalition had clearly gelled. He placed second in 
twelve states where the African American population was well under 
10 percent, meaning that he was obviously attracting others to his 
platform for racial inclusion and broader social change. Tate (1993, 
15) argues that he succeeded in mobilizing new Black voters and in- 
terest for presidential contests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the behavior African Americans have exhib- 
ited since the end of slavery. The path dictating their behavior has 
TABLE 4.12 Jesse Jackson Votesa by State in the 1988 Presidential Primaries 
Black Percentage 
of State Population, 
Stateb Votes Percent Position 1980 
New Hampshire 9,615 7.8 4 0.47 
South Dakota 3,867 5.4 6 0.3 1 
Vermont 13,044 5.7 2 0.23 
Alabama 176,764 43.6 1 25.50 
Arkansas 85,003 17.1 3 16.31 
Florida 254,912 20.0 2 13.78 
Georgia 247,83 1 39.8 1 26.81 
Kentucky 49,667 15.6 3 9.81 
Louisiana 221,532 35.5 1 29.45 
Maryland 152,642 28.7 2 22.70 
Massachusetts 133,141 18.7 2 3.85 
Mississippi 160,651 44.7 1 35.19 
Missouri 106,386 20.2 2 10.44 
North Carolina 224,177 33.0 2 22.43 
Oklahoma 52,417 13.3 4 6.77 
Rhode Island 7,445 15.2 2 2.89 
Tennessee 119,248 20.7 2 15.79 
Texas 433,335 24.5 2 11.98 
Virginia 164,709 45.1 1 18.86 
Illinois 484,233 32.2 2 14.65 
Connecticut 68,3 72 28.3 2 6.97 
Wisconsin 285,995 28.2 2 3.89 
New York 585,076 37.1 2 13.70 
Pennsylvania 41 1,260 27.3 2 8.79 
District of Columbia 68,840 80.0 1 70.24 
Indiana 145,021 22.5 2 7.55 
OhioC 378,866 27.4 2 9.97 
Nebraska 43,380 25.7 2 0.22 
West Virginia 45,788 13.5 2 3.34 
Oregon 148,207 38.1 2 1.42 
Idaho 8,066 15.7 2 0.29 
California 1,102,093 35.1 2 7.68 
Montana 26,908 22.1 2 0.22 
New Jersey 213,705 32.7 2 12.56 
New Mexico 52,988 28.1 2 1.77 
Total 6,685,699 29.1 2 11.70 
a Other serious contenders for more than half of the primary season 
(February through June) were Michael Dukakis (43 percent), A1 Gore (14 
percent), Richard Gephardt (6 percent), Paul Simon (4 percent), and Gary 
Hart (2 percent). 
States are listed in order of the date the primaries were held. 
Jackson slate. 
SO u RC  ES : Data from Congressional Quarterly Guide to U.S. Elections, 4th 
ed., 1994, 378-385; Salzman et al., Encyclopedia of Amcan American Culture 
and History, vol. 5, 1996, 3032. 
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been one of continuing struggle in a racialized environment. This 
path has sometimes featured resistance to or ambivalence about the 
inclusion of Blacks in the political process and broader American so- 
ciety, including discriminatory practices toward their exercise of the 
franchise. However, through struggle and in collaboration with sig- 
nificant allies throughout America, African Americans have achieved 
the formal legal mechanisms for universal freedom. In practice they 
have used these mechanisms and a variety of social-change strategies, 
such as mobilization, to participate in the political system. As the 
analysis showed, they began to do this with regularity during the 
colonial period, when they aligned with those who supported inclu- 
sion in a relentlessly racialized environment. 
That early platform for racial inclusion has constituted the pri- 
mary political agenda guiding African American political behavior 
ever since. Its primary effect is that African Americans act mostly as a 
bloc in electoral politics and consistently select partisan allies for 
their position on the question of racial inclusion. In the two-party 
system that has been in place for much of the nation's history, only 
rarely have both parties been regarded as having optimal positions 
on racial inclusion. Even long before the Civil War, it has been one or 
the other, forcing Blacks into a kind of one-party affiliation in an oth- 
erwise two-party system. 
First Blacks associated with the northern business classes, the par- 
tisan forerunners of the Republican Party, because they opposed slav- 
ery. At the time of the Civil War they supported the Party of Lincoln, 
the Republicans, regarded as the architects of the emancipation. 
Residual support for the Republicans outlasted the party's affirmative 
efforts for racial inclusion, a relatively short-lived period after the 
war. That was followed by a long period of virtually complete politi- 
cal exclusion resulting from the breach of the franchise in the South, 
where most Blacks lived. 
With the Great Depression and shifting alignments within the two 
parties, the Democrats became the party of choice for Blacks. 
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and a party platform espousing racial 
inclusion were signal events to the shift. Meanwhile, a major migra- 
tion that eventually brought nearly half of the African American 
population to urban centers in the North began to produce political 
results. Cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and New York used mobiliza- 
tion strategies in majority-Black electoral districts to elect their own 
to offices at the congressional and municipal levels. By 1940 most of 
these officials were wearing the Democratic Party label, a sentiment 
that continues apace to the present. This political success in the 
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North was matched in the South after an intense social movement 
for inclusion through the 1950s and 1960s. It began to bear fruit in 
the late 1960s, when the first Blacks were elected to local office in 
small towns and villages in majority-Black southern towns. By the 
1970s Blacks were sending their first congressional representative to 
Washington in 100 years. 
Overall, this mobilization produced what may be called a national 
Black electoral constituency, which Jesse Jackson brought to its high- 
est level of mobilization during his campaigns for the presidency. 
Voting registration levels among Blacks averaged well over 60 per- 
cent, and in some local and congressional districts where they were a 
voting majority, levels reached or exceeded 80 percent. The proof 
that this potential was being converted to actual voting lay in the ex- 
traordinary increase in the number of elected officials whose election 
was completely controlled by the turnout of Black voters. Clearly, 
they largely determined the fortunes of Jesse Jackson in his remark- 
able presidential primary successes. 
Moreover, the bloc voting of Blacks for the Democratic Party has 
on occasion influenced the outcome of presidential contests since 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, notably those of Jimmy Carter and Bill 
Clinton. The influence of African American political participation re- 
mains greatest in those districts and communities where they are 
able to pool their votes for the selection of one of their own. It is in 
these instances that their foremost agenda item, racial inclusion, is 
most consistently manifested. In the general partisan arena, it re- 
mains the case that the broader bases of the two parties make racial 
agenda items more difficult to support. And in any case, historically 
African Americans have perceived that only one of the parties at a 
time warranted the group's affiliation. 
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